Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-95-016 *25 January 1995*

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Contact Group to Sarajevo, Pale on Peace Mission

AU2001211095 Paris AFP in English 2054 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, Jan 20 (AFP)—Delegates from the five-power international Contact Group on Bosnia are to visit Sarajevo and the Bosnian Serb headquarters of Pale early next week for talks with the Bosnian Government and Serb leaders, a diplomat told AFP on Friday [20 January].

The diplomat said experts from Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States would go to Sarajevo, probably on Monday, to "pick up the thread" of the peace talks. "They will also go to Pale," he added.

The Contact Group will leave for Bosnia with the four-month cessation of hostilities accord brokered last month in danger of unravelling in the face of truce violations in the central region of Donji Vakuf and in the northwestern enclave of Bihac.

The Bihac pocket was Thursday the scene of artillery barrages near the town of Velika Kladusa as clashes continued between Bosnian Government troops and those of Moslem dissident and local warlord Fikret Abdic, a Serb ally.

Earlier Friday, group delegates held a meeting at the French mission in Geneva after Thursday meeting representatives from the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

Next week's meeting with the Bosnian Serbs will be the first official contact since July, when the Serbs rejected the international peace plan giving the Serbs 49 percent and the rest to the Moslem-Croat federation. The Serbs currently hold 70 percent.

But the group has already this month consulted Serbian leaders in Belgrade, Bosnian leaders in Sarajevo and Croatian leaders in Zagreb.

The plan remains on the table, but the Bosnian Serbs are insisting that it should be seen as only the basis for negotiations. The mainly Moslem Bosnian Government wants the plan fully upheld in its present form.

OIC representatives in Geneva meanwhile stressed they backed the plan as it stands as a "basis for a global peace accord."

Diplomatic sources said the Contact Group's talks with delegates from seven OIC states had helped to iron out misunderstandings and show there was no "deep-seated divergence" of views over Bosnia "even if differences remain."

But the OIC still backs the lifting of the international arms embargo in the Bosnian Government's favour as the organisation believes the Moslems are chiefly disadvantaged by it.

The OIC and Sarajevo are also worried that western states and Russia may allow the Bosnian Serbs to confederate with Serbia, as the Moslem-Croat federation in Bosnia has done with Croatia.

Generals Smith, Rose To Meet With Butrus-Ghali

AU2401130995 Paris AFP in English 1101 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Jan 24 (AFP)—British General Rupert Smith took command of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina overnight with no military ceremony and he and his predecessor left for Geneva Tuesday [24 January], UN officials said Tuesday.

Smith took over from General Michael Rose, also a Briton, at the force's main air base at Pleso, near Zagreb, at midnight (2300 GMT). He is expected to travel to Sarajevo on Wednesday.

Rose and Smith, as well as the UN commander for all of former Yugoslavia, French General Bertrand de Lapresle, and its civilian administrator, Yasushi Akashi, left Zagreb Tuesday morning for Geneva, where they will meet with UN Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali.

Croatia's request for UN troops to withdraw from its territory and the latest efforts of the Bosnia contact group are to top the agenda of the talks, officials said.

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Loans Granted To Combat Poverty in Countryside

AU2501121395 Tirana LAJMI I DITES in Albanian 12 Dec 94 p 2

[Article by Z. Pergega: "Private Farmers Financed by the Albanian Development Fund"]

[FBIS Translated Text] More than 2,570 private farmers were funded last year through loans of $500 to $1000 by the Albanian Development Fund, FZZH, aimed at improving the organization of the scheme to combat poverty in the countryside. This [total] 77.2-million-lek loan is at 6 percent interest and has a three-year term of payment. The amount of money returned from this loan was again distributed among groups of other farmers in the countryside, with the only condition for the loan being correct conduct on the part of the farmers.

In the first period, 60 percent of the farmers used their loan for animal husbandry, 17 percent to buy beasts of burden, and another 17 percent to acquire agricultural machinery, while the remaining farmers used it in handicraft, business, and service activities. "This wide range of uses for the loan is an expression of the growth of confidence and free initiative among the farmers in using the credit in many sectors as a means of profit, despite the great difficulties in infrastructure and in finding a market," said FZZH president Genc Juka.

In order to achieve progress in granting these loans, and their return, peasant loan councils were set up. Step by step, adequate measures were taken to train them, to draft the regulation, and to create the relevant documentation. Also created was a group of loan officials, and all these measures have eliminated any danger of misuse and corruption.

Cabinet Issues Budget Projections for Jan-Mar

AU2501121595 Tirana LAJMI I DITES in Albanian 21 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by Anila Stfa: "What Will the Revenue-Expenditure Relationship Be?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The budget for the first three months of 1995 has been approved by the Council of Ministers in a decision dated 9 January 1995.

The budget for January to March of this year envisages expenditures of around 14.683 billion leks and revenues of 11.020 billion. Thus, as is clearly seen from these figures, the budget deficit for this period will be 3.663 billion leks. The main way to fund this deficit is thought to be through internal bank loans, with treasury bonds considered a secondary means of covering it. According to this same decision, the main source of budget revenue will be taxes, which will account for more than 50 percent of the total. The remainder will be supplemented by nontax revenue, estimated at 2.1 billion leks, of which 1.7 billion will be secured from social security contributions and 500 million from the compensation fund.

The other side of the coin is how this revenue is to be used. Salaries, running costs, subsidies, economic aid for various sections of the population, and social insurance will put current expenditure at 13.433 billion leks. It has been envisaged that of this expenditure, personnel, or salaries, will account for 4.533 billion leks; social security payments 2.9 billion leks; and running costs 2.31 billion leks, while 1.310 billion leks will go to interest payments.

Economic subsidies as a separate category of expenditure are projected as reaching 805 million leks, while unemployment benefits will cost 450 million leks. Looking at the expenditure from a different point of view, according to different sectors of the economy, 209 million leks has been earmarked for industry and commerce, 177 million leks for agriculture, and 4 million leks for energy and mining.

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Meciar on EU, WEU, European Parliament Talks

LD2401153495 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar ended his talks with representatives of the European Union, the Western European Union, and the European Parliament in Brussels today. He spoke later at a news conference about his impressions. Agata Stanekova reports from the European Parliament building in Brussels.

[Stanekova] Following yesterday's talks, the Slovak delegation today visited the seat of the WEU, where Slovakia has the status of an associated partner. Vladimir Meciar, Deputy Prime Minister Jozef Kalman, and Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk were received by WEU Secretary General Jose Cutileiro. The Slovak prime minister then addressed the WEU Council. Vladimir Meciar stressed that the Slovak Republic is in favor of strengthening joint European defense policy and that, in harmony with the integration process of the Union, our striving to integrate in the Union acquires a security dimension. The Slovak Republic is pursuing foreign policy intended to contribute toward security throughout the continent. As Vladimir Meciar said in his address, we consider the WEU to be one of the fundamental building stones of a new European security architecture. [passage omitted]

Vladimir Meciar said that the development of cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the WEU should be carried out in close cooperation with activities related to NATO. We will equally optimize our participation in the Partnership for Pecae program, which we consider the first step on the path to joining NATO, he said.

In conclusion, Prime Minister Meciar assured the Council of Ambassadors that the Slovak Republic would actively contribute toward security and stability in Europe.

The meeting between Vladimir Meciar and European Parliament President Klaus Haensch finished a few minutes ago. Vladimir Meciar said the following about today's talks:

[Begin Meciar recording] We talked about our desire to submit an application to the European Union by 30 June of this year concerning the preparation of concrete steps toward changing the structure of society up to 2000, preparation for practical steps toward integration. We asked for help in the preparation of experts in the sphere of economics and law, which would help safeguard the harmonization of economic and legal systems. We assume that we will manage, using our own resources, to build a program of compatibility of political systems. Naturally, this question is very complicated; that is why it is not sufficient merely to declare good intentions. Society must get ready for what can be termed the shock of integration. We saw a similar thing in Germany in the unification of the eastern and western parts. That is why this preparation period must be a period of intensification of internal changes so that society as a whole may get ready as soon as possible. [end recording]

Interviewed on Brussels Visit

LD2401222395 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 2030 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] As we informed you in the main television news, the Slovak Government delegation today ended its two-day official visit to Belgium. Shortly before departure, our Brussels correspondent Marian Vakos asked Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar for a brief interview.

[Begin recording] [Vakos] Prime Minister, your visit to Belgium is, in fact, your first foreign visit after the formation of the new government. May I ask why Belgium?

[Meciar] In connection with the government policy statement, we considered it to be highly important to demonstrate the ambitions of the Slovak Republic to speed up the process of integration and cooperation with all European institutions. Therefore, the program of my visit was arranged so that I visited NATO headquarters, the Western European Union, and the European Parliament. I also held meetings with other officials in charge of developing European cooperation. I value these encounters highly. I regard them all as very civilized and positive.

[Vakos] You named the places you visited and the meetings you held. I would like to ask whether these meetings, talks, and deliberations fulfilled the expectations you brought with you from Bratislava. My second question is, what consequences will these talks have for the Slovak Government?

[Meciar] The first important issue is that all cooperation requires trust. We came here to restore this trust because there used to be mutual confidence in the past.

The second important matter concerns our goals and their timing. It is necessary to pay attention to both parties involved.

Slovakia is undergoing transformation; everything is changing, but this transformation ought to be completed by our entry into the European structures. We can, actually, mention one effect apparent from one rushed entry; that is the integration shock of the eastern part of Germany. Nothing like that must happen to Slovakia. Therefore, in the preparation period, we must mobilize all our own domestic resources in order to manage this preparation as effectively as possible.

Naturally, this requires the cooperation of experts and institutions, as well as the realistic projects of other members states of the European Union. The fact is not only that they are to accept us, but, on the other hand, we are actively applying. So they will accept us only after certain domestic problems and some issues concerning

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international stability in this area have been resolved. It was clearly stated: We are interested in you and in Hungary, but without your mutual problems. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Interior Minister: No 'Blanket' Personnel Changes

AU2401083695

[FBIS Editorial Report] Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 14 January and Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 16 January both publish interviews with Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek, in which the minister addresses issues ranging from administrative reform to personnel changes at the ministry.

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 14 January on pages 1 and 5 carries a 1,600-word interview with Hudek by Antonia Vymazalova and Juraj Handzo entitled "The Government Cannot Renounce Responsibility for the New Territorial and Administrative Division." The place and date of the interview are not given. In the opening part of the interview, Hudek discusses the ministry's plans concerning administrative reform and Slovakia's new territorial and administrative arrangement. He declares his intention to "follow up on the positive aims of the reform of 1993/94 in the horizontal integration of local state administration bodies, in the establishment of higher-level entities of territorial self-administration, and in transferring powers from state bodies to territorial self-administration bodies." He tells the interviewers that, at the beginning of the year, the government established the "Government Council for Public Administration" to coordinate and assess all reform proposals. The Council, which is chaired by Hudek himself, will reportedly create two working groups—one for Slovakia's new administrative and territorial division and one for the "horizontal integration of local state administration bodies." In the minister's opinion, the administrative reform "should neither be accelerated at any price nor delayed. It is necessary to seek solutions providing for the establishment of an effective and rational local public administration, while retaining its two-tier system."

Speaking about the country's new division into administrative and territorial units, Hudek says that all of the "variants" proposed thus far have had their advantages and disadvantages and that the final model must be such "as will correspond not only to our conditions but also to European trends." While the minister does not present any specific proposal of his own, he says that the new territorial entities must be "economically viable, able to deal with problems of socioeconomic development." He advocates a "rational" approach to this issue and rejects its "politicization." He also rejects the proposal by the Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia (ZMOS) that ZMOS take the initiative in preparing the reform, saying that the government cannot renounce responsibility for an issue of such importance as the country's new territorial and administrative arrangement.

Next, Hudek comments on what he regards as the "for Slovakia unsuitable situation at the Czech-Slovak border." He says that, even though Slovakia has signed readmission agreements, providing for the repatriation of illegal immigrants, with all its neighbors, it must still reinforce the "real physical protection of the green border.' This is necessary, he says, because the return of illegal immigrants is very complicated and costly and Slovakia could otherwise become "an assembly center for people that other countries refuse to accept." He mentions that, "in the first stage," the Interior Ministry will deploy an additional 200 persons at the Slovak-Czech border.

Speaking about the government's intentions in combating crime, Hudek mentions that the government is working on a "Clean Hands" program designed to improve cooperation between the police, prosecution bodies, and the courts in the struggle against corruption. The final draft of the "Clean Hands" program, which Hudek describes as a "set of organizational, legislative, and personnel measures aimed against corruption and other negative social phenomena," is reportedly to be discussed by the government in February. In this context, Hudek notes that, on 3 January, the government set up the "Government Council for Struggle Against Anti-Social Activity," of which he is the chairman.

The concluding passage of the interview deals with recent personnel changes in the police force. It reads:

"[PRAVDA] After you became minister, there was a change in the posts of the police president and his two deputies, and, according to your predecessor Ladislav Pittner, the replacement of more than 30 district police commanders is being prepared. Why have those personnel measures been taken, or why are they to be taken?

"[Hudek] The deputies of the president of the Slovak Republic Police Corps were not dismissed by me as minister. Both of them submitted their requests, one for being relieved of his post, the other for being released from service with the Police Corps, on 13 December 1994—that is, still under Minister Pittner. The previous minister of interior complied with both requests the same day. As for former Police President Mr. Stefan Lastovka, he was recalled by the Slovak Government on 3 January and released from service with the police force the same day. Mr. Lastovka had himself requested to be released from service, which I agree to. At the same time, I asked him to remain in his post until a new police president is appointed. Regarding reports about the planned dismissal of more than 30 district police commanders, I would only add that their spreading does not contribute to the creation of calm conditions for their work. I have not prepared any list of 'inconvenient' people. I will assess every employee according to the results of his work. There will not be any blanket changes in these posts."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 16 January on pages 1 and 3 carries a 1,000-word interview

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with Ludovit Hudek by Peter Sporer entitled "We Are Not Preparing Any Large-Scale Personnel Changes." In the interview, the place and date of which are not given, the interior minister reiterates that he is not preparing any major personnel changes at the ministry and in the police force. Responding to a specific question, Hudek denies the existence of "political pressure" to dismiss General Jaroslav Ivor, director of the Police Corps Office of Investigations, and asserts that, had he intended to replace him, he could have done so already.

Asked about the ministry's role in drafting the law on the protection of the Republic, the interior minister replies that "the Interior Ministry is not preparing any laws in this direction at present" and that such a bill features neither in the government's legislative plan for 1995 nor in the government's policy statement.

The interior minister is also asked about his successor as prosecutor general of the Slovak Republic, the post he held before becoming minister. Hudek explains that, until a new prosecutor general is appointed, the General Prosecutor's Office will be headed by Deputy Prosecutor Generals Messrs. Matasovsky and Valo, who have been "entrusted with its management."

KDH Head Rejects Meciar's Political Overtures

AU2501110295 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 21 Jan 95 p 2

[TASR report: "Vladimir Meciar—Jan Carnogursky"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 18 January, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar met with Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] Chairman Jan Carnogursky and KDH Deputy Chairman Jan Figel at the Slovak Government Office. The conversation concerned the international position of the Slovak Republic. The prime minister offered Carnogursky participation in informal meetings of leading constitutional officials on foreign policy issues, in the preparation of Pope John Paul II's visit, and in the provision of political guarantees for foreign investment in the Slovak Republic. Carnogursky does not currently see conditions for his participation in meetings on foreign policy, which is closely tied up with domestic policy. On the other hand, he promised the KDH's participation in the preparation of the papal visit and in the provision of political guarantees for foreign investment, provided the commercial terms of the foreign investment projects are transparent, determined in advance, and advantageous for Slovakia.

Defense Approves Provisional 1st-Quarter Budget

AU2501113195 Bratislava OBRANA in Slovak 21 Jan 95 p 1

[Unattributed report in the "Latest Report" column]

[FBIS Translated Text] At its meeting on 11 January 1995, the defense minister's board [kolegium] discussed and approved the draft specification of the Slovak Defense Ministry's revenue and expenditure for the first quarter of 1995, during the period of the provisional budget.

In keeping with the specification of binding tasks and indicators of the state budget, the following limits were set for the defense department: total revenue of 14,250,000 Slovak korunas [Sk] and total expenditure of Sk2,654,838,000.

The set volume of expenditure raises demands on the economical, sensible, and efficient use of allocated budget resources for the fulfillment of the defense department's tasks during the period of the provisional budget in a way that will secure the most fundamental needs of military units and facilities. The budget secures funds associated with the drafting of conscripts in the first quarter of 1995.

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Kovacs, Romanian Official Hold News Conference

LD2401193895 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1700 GMT 24 Jan 95

[Report by an unidentified correspondent on a news conference held by Laszlo Kovacs, Hungarian foreign minister, and Viorel Hrebenciuc, visiting Romanian Government secretary general, in Budapest on 24 January—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After his meeting with Viorel Hrebenciuc, secretary general of the Romanian Government, Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs said that he and his guest reviewed bilateral Hungarian-Romanian relations. The two men agreed that these had moved out of the earlier deadlock of last summer. They both considered it important that expert discussions are under way in several areas.

The foreign minister—to quote his own words—did not surprise the secretary general by also mentioning those problems that are causing serious trouble [zavar] in the relations between the two countries. Kovacs stated that the regular anti-Hungarian pronouncements by the chairman of a Romanian coalition party [not further identified] are threating the existence of Romania's Hungarian minority. According to Kovacs, these events could cause serious trouble in Hungarian-Romanian relations; moreover, they also harm the assessment of Romania in a wider sense.

Kovacs welcomed the secretary general's indication that Kovacs's Romanian counterpart, Teodor Melescanu, has proposed a meeting for 1 February in Strasbourg. [passage omitted]

Hrebenciuc described his discussion with the foreign minister as fruitful. It is the personal conviction of the Romanian secretary general that the meeting of the two foreign ministers planned for 1 February represents a real step forward in bilateral relations, particularly in view of the fact that the agreement on minority protection is also going to be signed in Strasbourg.

According to Hrebenciuc, in the interest of eliminating the trouble in Hungarian-Romanian relations, the two governments should conduct a permanent dialogue, and the problems now presenting themselves in the ranks of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [HDUR] must be resolved. Hrebenciuc thinks the HDUR must decide when it is going to act as a party and when it will act as an organization that represents interests. He promised that as soon as he returns to Bucharest, he will confer with all HDUR leaders regardless of what platform of the party they belong to.

Hrebenciuc then said that Romania and its government are ready to improve their relations with Hungary rapidly and radically.

Foreign Minister on Romanian 'Tension'

LD2401225495 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1730 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs received Viorel Hrebenciuc, Romanian Government secretary general, in Budapest today. Following the talks, Levente Suekoesd interviewed the foreign minister. [passage omitted]

[Suekoesd] What was the atmosphere at the talks? You have said that the answers were honest but not reassuring.

[Kovacs] They were not reassuring because the situation itself is not reassuring and Mr. Hrebenciuc did not try to make out the situation in Romania and the Romanian government's circumstances as being nicer than they are in reality. Aside from this fact, the talks were held in a cordial atmosphere. [passage omitted]

[Suekoesd] You have received Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu's message that he would like to meet with you in Strasbourg on 1 February. What do you expect? Will you have to discuss the same issue as you did this time with Hrebenciuc, or will the next few days be enough for the situation to be changed in a positive direction?

[Kovacs] I would like it very much if developments could take place by the beginning of February that would make it unnecessary to again raise these problems with Mr. Melescanu—that is, the attacks against the Hungarians in Romania, which have led to serious tension in Hungarian-Romanian relations. However, I am not at all certain that this will happen by that time. In that case, I will raise these problems again. And of course we will review bilateral relations, including the way forward. We will exchange views on the question of the basic treaty, as well as links between the basic treaty and the agreement on European stability. Practically every topic that concerns the two countries' relations will be raised.

[Suekoesd] What kind of Romanian Government steps are required in order to eliminate tension in our relations?

[Kovacs] I am of the view that at least two things are definitely necessary. One of them is that these anti-Hungarian attacks not be repeated. The other is that the Romanian Government make its position clear. The situation where certain members of the Romanian Government make anti-Hungarian statements or attack the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [HDUR] and the Romanian Government remains silent cannot go on. What also cannot be continued is for Gheorghe Funar, the chairman of one of the Romanian government coalition parties and mayor of Kolozsvar [Cluj-Napoca], to regularly make anti-Hungarian statements and have the Romanian Government not comment on it.

Another thing that also cannot continue is for the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] itself to make a

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statement that practically demands the banning of the HDUR and proposes the exchange of populations—that is, driving the Hungarians of Romania out from their native land—and have the Romanian Government remain silent.

The Romanian Government must take a stand on these matters and make it unambiguous that these statements do not reflect the Romanian Government's position. Furthermore, even more is necessary: It has to be made clear that the Romanian Government does not identify itself with these statements and documents. And this affects not only Hungarian-Romanian relations. This, too, I said to Mr. Hrebenciuc. It also affects Romania's international reputation in a very negative way. [passage omitted]

[Suekoesd] Yesterday, Mr. Hrebenciuc told Csaba Tabajdi that the differences here are of form only. They are differences of approach, since the Hungarian and Romanian sides are assessing the same concepts in different ways. For example, he said that the word self-government does not exist in the Romanian legal system. Al the Romanian legal system has is the concept of local administration.

Mr. Tabajdi's reply to this was that the difference is in translation only; that one could be compared to the French and the other to the English translation. Do you believe that the difference has to do with form alone, that that alone is the essence of the dispute?

[Kovacs] No, this is not the subject of the dispute. It is a specific element in the dispute—and it is not the most serious, most important, element. The statements to which I referred were, for example, the demand by Mr. Funar or his party that the HDUR be outlawed, banned, and the proposal that Romania be made more ethnically homogeneous by means of population exchanges. These are not translation issues, these are basic issues of substance. It is an attitude that is unacceptable and completely contrary to European norms.

[Suekoesd] Mr. Hrebenciuc must be in a rather awkward situation, and so must the politicians within the government who have had to yield to the pressure of their coalition partners. The extreme nationalists have entered the government and are able to veto important economic laws too. Decisions cannot be reached in parliament without them. In your view, is there any chance for the internal power relations to change in Romania?

[Kovacs] Mr. Hrebenciuc indicated that he is not in an easy situation. He said he has come to Hungary at the most unfavorable time possible, but that he thought he should nonetheless undertake the journey. He said that when he reached agreement in December with Csaba Tabajdi [Hungarian political state secretary in charge of minority affairs] on the date for the trip, they had not expected the relationship between the two countries to be like this. But he said that he had nonetheless undertaken to come and try to shed light on the background of these very unpleasant, very damaging statements. And he talked, precisely, about these issues.

He talked about the internal power relationships in Romania. He said that the leading government party, with its 34 percent parliamentary representation, is dependent on the cooperation of other parties. He said that it is not possible in Romania to implement important economic laws, laws facilitating economic transformation, if they do not gain the support of these forces, so they are concluding a compromise of necessity and are putting up with various types of pronouncements by the extreme parties of the coalition.

[Suekoesd] Do you think the real issue is that the HDUR ought to clarify whether it will hold talks with the government as primarily a political party or as an interest-representation body, the body representing the interests of the Hungarians of Romania? Mr. Hrebenciuc said this is an important issue for him.

[Kovacs] He said this at the talks. I do not consider it to be an important issue. Of course, he is right when discussing a single given, concrete subject—this is how he put it at the talks—inasmuch as the HDUR raises certain political issues as a political party and this might not go to Mr. Hrebenciuc's desk. It might not concern him as the government's secretary general, nor concern him as the member of the Romanian Government in charge of minority issues. Therefore, there could be specific cases where the two diverge.

However, this is far from being the issue at hand, because the problem in Romania—with the Hungarians in Romania or even the HDUR—is not this.

To go back to the question of power relations, which Mr. Hrebenciuc mentioned, saying they now are in a situation of constraint—I told him that at least two scenarios are possible at such a time. One possibility is the best case scenario [previous three words in English], which they reckon with: that they manage to implement these economic laws; they carry out the unpopular measures; and the country's economy takes an upward course. It sets off on the path of stabilization; and as a result, the ruling party, the largest government party, Mr. Hrebenciuc's party, has such (?success) that in 1996, it no longer is dependent on the support of extreme forces, of the extremist parties.

However, a worst case scenario [previous three words in English] is possible—and there have been examples of this in history: when the temporary reconciliation with the extreme forces in the end destroys, politically and morally, the party that thought that the compromise would be only temporary—and it performs much more poorly in the elections in 1996.

[Suekoesd] In your view, would it not have been better if [Hungarian President] Arpad Goencz had, as a positive

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gesture, received the Romanian delegation? This, in my opinion, would have been the case if Mr. Hrebenciuc had met Arpad Goencz. Aren't you afraid this will be seen in Romania as a negative step, and that they will say: Well, we wanted to hold talks; we went to Budapest and were not received?

[Kovacs] First and foremost, I should like to point out that Mr. Hrebenciuc, who is the Romanian Government's secretary general, is not, from the viewpoint of rank, a person whom the president of the Republic must receive. A meeting with Arpad Goencz was raised as a possibility when the program was prepared, but it was not finalized, so there is no question of a meeting agreed upon in advance's having been renounced on the part of the Hungarians.

If Arpad Goencz had received Secretary General Hrebenciuc, this, to be sure, would have been a positive gesture of great importance. I think that it is not necessary for me to demonstrate that under such circumstances and negative influences of the type befalling Hungarian-Romanian relations in the past weeks, there is no justification for making a political gesture, a positive gesture, of such importance.

However, the failure for the meeting to come about, the fact that there was no such meeting in the end, is undoubtedly an indication that Hungary was not pleased with the attacks by the extreme Romanian forces on the Hungarians of Romania and the HDUR.

Romanian Official Terms Budapest Talks 'Fruitful'

AU2501084295 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 24 Jan 95

[Interview with Romanian Government Secretary General Viorel Hrebenciuc by Dorin Suciu in Budapest on 24 January—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Suciu] Esteemed Mr. Secretary General, I recall that Toparceanu, our great poet from the northern part of the country, once wrote that certain people said he lacked talent. Well, that is precisely what I am proud of, said Toparceanu, because it is easy to write if one is talented. However, let us see who is able to write if one lacks talent!

Well, the same thing could be said here: It is easy to engage in diplomacy and hold talks if the circumstances are customary and normal, but let us see who is able to deliver results if the circumstances are less than normal.

[Hrebenciuc] I am never scared by less-than-normal circumstances. I have always tried to solve problems that are less normal, rather than the usual ones. The important thing is that the talks that took place during my Budapest visit—at the invitation of Mr. Csaba Tabajdi, head [state secretary] of the Hungarian prime minister's office, who coordinates the activity of the ethnic minorities in Hungary as well as those of the ethnic Hungarians living beyond Hungary's borders—broached hot issues and were, as I have already said, very fruitful.

I have to say that the [20 January] declaration issued by the Romanian Government caused a genuine commotion here in Budapest. However, we consider it absolutely normal and in compliance with our laws and Constitution. I explained the necessary points about the context in which the aforementioned declaration was issued. Similarly, suspicion was also caused here by the protocol signed by the Social Democracy Party of Romania with the other three parties supporting the government [Romanian National Unity Party, Greater Romania Party, and Socialist Party of Labor]. I also explained clearly that the protocols we sign and the coalitions we establish are the business of the parliamentary parties of Romania and of no one else, because the specific circumstances in each country lead to certain political results. Therefore, I feel I was sufficiently eloquent, even if some of the things I said did not suit them.

I believe that the dialogue that was continued here in Budapest—continuing the talks held last month in Bucharest—yielded positive results. Let me explain.

Considering that on 1 February in Strasbourg, Romania, represented by State Minister [and Foreign Affairs Minister] Teodor Melescanu, will sign the Basic Convention on Ethnic Minority Rights, this will also be an important step forward with respect to the basic treaty currently being discussed by Bucharest and Budapest. I discussed the issues pertaining to this treaty with [Hungarian] Foreign Affairs Minister Laszlo Kovacs.

Another issue that generated numerous rounds of discussions here was the action of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] against the Romanian Government, and, generally, the UDMR's place in Romanian politics. I insist on telling the Romanian public what I also said here in Budapest: namely, that the UDMR has to understand once and for all that, on the one hand, it is a political party, while, on the other hand, it is an organization of ethnic Hungarians living in Romania.

The government may not talk to the UDMR in its capacity as a political party. In that capacity, the UDMR may be approached solely by other political parties rather than by the government. Nevertheless, we are talking to the UDMR in its capacity as the organization of ethnic Hungarians living in Romania. If the UDMR leaders refuse to understand once and for all that in this capacity they have to talk to the government—since this is the reason they were also given a place in the Ethnic Minority Council—that's their problem, and their responsibility, too. The way they refuse dialogue—and I will invite them to talk again as soon as I return to Bucharest—is not favorable for achieving the objectives they claim: to serve the interests of the ethnic Hungarians. On the contrary, we have always said that the way they act does not even serve the interests of the ethnic Hungarians.

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This is a pity, because the tolerance level in Romania—which is a century-old thing rather than a recent one—is not appropriate for such debates, which can easily heat up and cause turmoil in Romanian politics. I say all this because I know the issue very well, as I have been leading the Ethnic Minority Council of Romania set up two years ago. The fact that the UDMR is claiming not to be a member of the Council, and yet they accept the money granted to the ethnic minorities by the Council, speaks clearly for itself as regards the UDMR's attitude. I mentioned all these things here in Budapest as well.

[Suciu] Mr. Secretary General, a very serious news agency has been carrying a slightly misleading piece of news: namely, namely that your meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn did not take place as a sign of, let us say, protest or dissociation with respect to the declaration issued by the Romanian Government.

[Hrebenciuc] I have learned that this news has caused an uproar in Bucharest, too. Let me tell you that I never asked to be received by either Mr. Horn or Mr. Goncz. Those meetings were included in the official schedule I received upon my arrival in Budapest. Obviously, I am referring to my meeting with Mr. Horn—not with Mr. Goncz.

I have seen Mr. Horn's schedule for today, and as a person who works within a government, I know very well what the schedules of prime ministers look like on days when they are expected to receive other prime ministers—and not just any prime minister, but, of all things, the prime minister of Slovakia, Mr. Vladimir Meciar. I am not interpreting this issue in any way, and I would recommend to the organizations in the news business that they circulate correct information rather than news reports like that, which do not correspond to reality.

Kovacs Says Russia No Longer 'Global Power'

AU2401132595 Vienna PROFIL in German 23 Jan 95 p 17

[Interview with Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs by an unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "Six Questions to Laszlo Kovacs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [PROFIL] You are coming to Austria this week. What is there to discuss?

[Kovacs] Austria's EU [European Union] membership could be problematic for us. The treaties between our countries are going to be replaced by an agreement between the EU and Hungary. That could affect sales of Hungarian goods or border procedures. One of the main purposes of my visit is to prevent Brussels from strangling our relations.

[PROFIL] What does Hungary want from the EU?

[Kovacs] We want the negotiations on our EU membership to begin in 1996. Only Hungary should be examined in this process—not all the six countries that want to join. We do not want Romania to have to wait for us, and of course we do not want to wait for others. We are counting on Austria's help here.

[PROFIL] But Hungary will not be able to meet the required standards until about the year 2010.

[Kovacs] We will be able to do so by the turn of the century. When Spain, Portugal, and Greece were admitted into the EU, they were far below EU standards. Hungary will be far higher.

[PROFIL] You want to join NATO just like all the countries of Central Europe. Why are you in such a hurry?

[Kovacs] We are not considering the danger of war, but NATO is one of the most effective ways of preserving stability in this region. NATO's expansion must proceed in such a way that Russia does not view it as provocation. NATO will have to intensify its partnership with Russia.

[PROFIL] What does the Chechen war mean for East Europe?

[Kovacs] Chechnya is a part of the Russian Federation. The situation is serious but it is not an international conflict. One cannot assume from it that Russia would intervene in Central Europe. Russia is not a global power, and it will not be one in the near future. Nor will it develop any military sphere of influence.

[PROFIL] You were a Communist and today you are governing together with former dissidents from the Alliance of Free Democrats. How do you feel about this?

[Kovacs] This has been a historic compromise. Over the last four years in parliament, I have felt that we are speaking the same language. We needed a stable government, and today I must say: That was the best thing that we could have done. We are a coalition of modernizers.

MSZP Leader Views Privatization, Coalition

AU2401082995 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 23 Jan 95 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Laszlo Mate, deputy chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party, by Mihaly Bak; place and date not given: "There Should Be Less Discord and More Cooperation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Laszlo Mate, deputy chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], has stated that the acceleration of privatization is a goal of the Socialist-led government, but a coordinating minister is needed. The government's influence has to be increased when large enterprises are sold.*

Mate claims that there is a choice—that is: we need not give away the assets at a low price. Mate trusts that a calmer period will follow but, in his view, the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] has to restrain itself.

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[Bak] If we are going to have two new ministries [privatization and European integration], as has been suggested, then this contradicts the government program that advocates a cheap state. Two ministries were merged in the summer, and the position of privatization minister—which is now to be restored—was abolished. What has changed since then?

[Mate] If we have a new governmental structure, this will not be more expensive than the previous one. Staffing cannot increase, and we have to continue the streamlining that was decided upon six weeks ago. A constraint exists in Hungary: namely, that expenditure can only increase slightly. When we talk about the reform of the state administration, the point is that the country is unable to keep welfare and community expenditures at the current level.

[Bak] After the ministerial position [for privatization] was abolished, privatization proceeded relatively independently under the supervision of the Finance Ministry. The HungarHotels issue [cancellation of privatization of hotel chain] and the restoration of ministerial control suggests the institutionalization of government intervention.

[Mate] I do not know whether we will have a privatization minister....

[Bak] This has been suggested....

[Mate] I do not even know if such a suggestion exists. The acceleration of privatization is certainly a goal of the Socialist government. The content of your question presumes that the law on privatization was completed by September. This is not what happened. I believe that bringing privatization under the finance minister's competence is still a subject of debate, and it will remain so. Privatization is something more complicated than simply filling the budget deficit or keeping the debt stock in hand with its revenue. It is linked to unemployment and the situation of certain regions. The privatization of the energy sector is connected to the fate of the mines, and so on. I do not believe that all these can be narrowed down to a single ministry.

I agree that we need a person who can coordinate these tasks; I do not believe it is possible to perform proper privatization without the support of the entire government. This cannot mean that the government should intervene in all privatization cases because, if it does, then it is making a big mistake. However, in the major cases—for example, the case of the MOL [Hungarian Oil and Natural Gas Corporation], or the electricity suppliers, or the MATAV [Hungarian Telecommunications Enterprise]—the government has to see what their sale means. The government's influence in these cases will surely have to increase.

[Bak] Placing privatization under indirect supervision was a strategic and conceptual decision at the time. According to rumors, this has been changed, mainly because of pressure from the MSZP's trade union line and the interest groups linked to it.

[Mate] I do not know when and how news can emerge that this is the way the interest groups of the MSZP conduct politics. However, I do know that we are a Socialist party, and we cannot follow a practice of first privatizing something and then seeing what happens. We are united in the belief that the state is the worst proprietor, and that whatever can be sold should be sold. The debate is over the methods. We cannot use simplistic models.

[Bak] In connection with the HungarHotels issue and coinciding with the statements of the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP], there are increasingly strong suggestions that these large enterprises should be owned by Hungarians—although, in Hungary, the kind of large capital that is needed for these investments does not exist.

[Mate] It is possible that this is the view of the two opposition parties, but their former practice was quite different. They sold many assets to foreigners, assets that could also have been operated by Hungarian proprietors. We are actually often giving the market to foreigners. Foreign investors are needed where an injection of capital is required. However, this must not result in our giving away the assets that were created with great effort by society over four decades. We would primarily like to help establish a Hungarian strata of proprietors.

[Bak] That was the amount the market offered for the hotels.

[Mate] We do have a choice: namely, we will not sell for that amount. We are not in a forced situation where we would have to sell the assets below the market price, as in a shutting-down sale.

[Bak] You recently said that you are striving for a role of integrator. You always support the weakening line in the party. Does this mean that you will now support the so-called liberal wing—for example the Bekesi program—which appears to be loosing support?

[Mate] This is a very good question. In my view, future plans have to be reconsidered. We will have serious problems in 1998 if we carry on with the current practice of "we are together and we are not, and we love each other and we do not," if we are coalition partners while a certain amount of unwillingness can also be seen. These everyday petty games have to be suppressed, because the public does not like this. In my view, [Finance Minister] Bekesi has not become weaker. He is not losing control of privatization—but its supervision will be much broader.

[Bak] The prime minister is often blamed for this "cat and dog friendship." His unexpected decisions are mentioned. At the government meeting, he did not even

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mention that he would, a day later, suggest the establishment of two ministries. Would prior consultation not be necessary?

[Mate] I hope a calmer period is forthcoming, but I can also see some need for restraint in the SZDSZ.

[Bak] Not long before the 1994 elections, you did not support the coalition. Has your opinion changed?

[Mate] You are wrong. I have never been against the coalition. Everything proves that none of the parties can govern on their own. We need less bickering and more cooperation, and the coalition is the way to this—with the inclusion of even more parties, if this is possible. However, at the moment, the SZDSZ is the only possible long-term partner.

[Bak] Until October, you were the MSZP's treasurer. What was the reason for the relatively large deficit you left behind, some 200 million [forints], although the MSZP spent the smallest amount on the elections?

[Mate] In my view, we performed our job successfully. The party successfully accounted for its assets, and we created a well-organized party in spite of the very low amount of budget support.

In my view, the MSZP is in the best financial position. I can tell you that I was extremely happy when I was able to pass on the post of treasurer.

[Bak] Now you can spend more time with your own enterprises. You acquired a significant amount of assets in enterprises in four years. To what extent is this success linked to your having been the MSZP's treasurer?

[Mate] I was very careful not to mix these two areas. Being an entrepreneur is my main job, and in addition to this, I am involved in politics—because one cannot watch events as an outsider; one has to have a say in affairs. I mainly buy enterprises that are in a bad situation and I improve them with expertise and diligence.

[Bak] However, you are now a leader of the biggest government party. Will this not play any role in your future expansion?

[Mate] Since the inauguration of the new government, my greatest dilemma has been whether or not I should participate in privatization bids, and whether or not I am allowed to. The public does not like this, and I am speaking in vain when I say that this has no significance, if practice shows otherwise. I restrain myself in privatization, and I will, in the future, develop already-existing enterprises.

[Bak] No significant personnel change is expected in the government. Is this the result of coalition bargaining or have the ministers proved to be good?

[mate] In my view, they—from both parties—have proved themselves. Changes will certainly occur later. However, I would like to state that this is the prime minister's responsibility. If he asks for the replacement of any party's minister, it has to be accepted on both sides. If he does not wish to make a change now, then this means that he has personal confidence in everyone.

Energy Sector Privatization To Begin This Year

LD2401154295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In Vienna, Laszlo Pal, the Hungarian minister of industry and trade, has promised that the privatization of the energy industry will begin this year. Peter Zentai reports from Vienna.

[Zentai] Invitations for bids for the privatization of the power stations and the electricity works will be published as early as the first quarter of the year. At a conference organized by a major bank in Vienna, Pal confirmed that the state would keep only a majority of shares in the Paks Atomic Energy Plant, the headquarters of the Hungarian Electricity Works, and the national electric power grid. At the same time we expect the foreign strategic partners—that is: the future main and co-owners—to buy a certain amount of Hungarian coal, and we want the privatized power stations to continue to supply district heating, he said.

A large part of the income from the accelerated privatization of the energy sector will be used to offset the deficit in the public finances. This transpired from the Hungarian minister's speech. [passage omitted]

Report Puts Forward Medium-Term Economic Policy

AU2401093495 Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 19 Jan 95 p 20

[Unattributed report: "Combined Economic Policy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the medium-term economic policy guidelines, only a combined economic policy that deals with stabilization and modernization concomitantly and in a coordinated way can be successfully applied in the current situation. In the course of this, stabilization takes priority and the results of faster modernization can appear gradually, later. The strategy that has to be submitted to the government on the basis of the guidelines by the end of March will have to be a policy-type document. It will have to define the tasks and actions as well as the goals.

This is a summary of the most important guidelines:

1. In the past years of the changeover to a market economy, we have not managed to alleviate significantly the economy's backwardness, indebtedness, and vulnerable balance situation. The main reason for this is the weakness of the economy's structural change.

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2. The goal is to be able to live in a modern civil society that has a market economy as a background and gradually achieve the requirements of membership in the European Union. A general balance of the economy is the foundation for a combined economic policy and a well-functioning economy; however, only the balance of a developing economy can be seen to be stable.

3. Essential changes have to be achieved in three areas to achieve stabilization:

a. stopping the increase of foreign debt (the deficit of the current balance of payments should be no larger than the incoming working capital);

b. significantly reducing the state administration's deficit (the population's savings should also satisfy the credit needs of the entrepreneurial sector);

c. slowing down inflation significantly, after the temporary increase at the beginning of 1995.

In the stabilization process, a principle of radical gradualness has to be followed. In other words: Better results have to be achieved in 1995 than would come anyway with the passage of time, and targets must not be reduced later. The ratio of exports and imports must be significantly improved and the share of investment must be increased in domestic consumption. The state deficit must be reduced to 3 or 4 percent of the GDP within three years. An interest rate policy that maintains positive real interest on deposits must be sustained, but we must also achieve a reduction of the nominal interest level and the interest margin. The exchange rate policy must be flexible, and it must basically keep the real rate of exchange at a given level.

4. The economy's modernization is a structural change that will result in the following:

a. private ownership will be dominant in the economy;

b. the state's role in the economy and its function of redistributing incomes will decrease;

c. the structural transformation of industry and agriculture will accelerate, and the financial and capital market institutions will be stronger;

d. the economy's infrastructural deficiencies will be reduced;

e. a modern educational system will be created;

f. a system of multifaceted welfare security will evolve that blends state care with charitable forms;

g. we will be linked to the integration of developed countries as a result of changing the institutional and legal systems and the economic structure.

The first four of the above tasks can be largely achieved by 1997-1998, and the second four by the year 2000.

5. Improving the competitiveness of enterprises is the most important area of economic modernization. Its important elements are the following: accelerating privatization by a reasonable degree, efficiently exercising ownership rights in enterprises with a majority state-ownership, establishing financial conditions that improve the enterprises' self-financing abilities and their abilities to take on loans and include more capital, conducting an open foreign economic policy, placing crisis management mechanisms at the service of sound selection, and inhibiting the black economy.

6. A developed market economy demands a stable, safe, and liquid financial system that is sparing with expenditures. To achieve this, it is necessary to, among other things: modernize the operation of the financial institutions—privatize the banks, establish the missing institutional and legal conditions, mortgage, risk capital funds, and so forth; expand the range of tax bases and taxpayers, linked to reducing the number of tax rates as much as possible; better manage the domestic state debt; and improve the state's financial management.

7. The reform of the state administration means a significant reduction in, and internal reorganization of, state expenditures and a concurrent release of resources for the entrepreneurial sphere.

Leader Denies Engaging in Separatist Actions

LD2401213995 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1730 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In Budapest, Viorel Hrebenciuc, the Romanian Government's secretary general, has met Csaba Tabajdi, the political state secretary in the Office of the Prime Minister who is in charge of minority affairs. [passage omitted]

Peter Marvanyi called Csaba Takacs, executive chairman of the HDUR [Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania]:

[Begin recording] [Marvanyi] HDUR executive chairman Csaba Takacs is on the line. According to the most recent report from Romania, President Iliescu has condemned, quote: separatist endeavors of all types—albeit he did not mention the HDUR by name. What is known about this?

[Takacs] The president did his constitutional duty. The HDUR also condemns all separatist actions. It condemns the HDUR's program being mentioned in this context and the HDUR's being cited in connection with such actions. All of the HDUR's pronouncements and political endeavors, which were proclaimed two years ago, are expressed in the various minority self-government and local government forms, and these are far removed from the category of separatist actions that is being presented to the Romanian public.

[Marvanyi] The Romanian government statement said that there is no such thing as local self-government in the Romanian Constitution.

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[Takacs] Self-government is not in the Romanian Constitution. What is in there is the issue of local authorities [helyi autonomiak]. But I cannot understand how it is possible to accept Romania's commitment in signing the European charter of local self-governments—which, as in Clause No. 20 of the Romanian Constitution, is valid and obligatory for Romania as internal practice.

This is not at issue here. What is at issue is that a serious and very resolute anti-HDUR campaign has begun as a red herring in order to justify to everyone, and make them accept, the fact that the ruling party has incorporated into the government a triple coalition that, in its various political aspects, clearly embodies the policy of the previous Ceausescu regime. This is the first thing.

Second, the HDUR's Council of Local Governments is subject to attacks. It is a working group, organization, that, in the final analysis—and we are ashamed of this—was not thought up by us. Rather, we observed the activity of similar bodies set up by other parties such as the Democratic Party—whose organization, called the League of Local Government Councils, is registered as a legal entity—or the Peasants' Party and the Civic Alliance, which have within the party such bodies dealing with local government. The HDUR's version is based on their example and is one of them. As is known, the task of the opposition is to offset the central state power as much as possible, at least at the administrative level. [passage omitted]

[Marvanyi] The Romanian justice minister raised the prospect—although this is now allegedly, seen as having been his personal opinion—of launching procedures to eliminate, ban, the HDUR. What would this mean? Is there any sign that this might really begin? What countermeasures could the HDUR take in this matter?

[Takacs] I do not consider this ruled out, since the justice minister represents the PUNR, Romanian National Unity Party, in the government. We all know it as Gheorghe Funar's party. It is not in vain that they targeted this Ministry of Justice.

We do not consider the possibility of launching such an action to be ruled out. The HDUR of course has its own experts, legal experts and constitutional experts who would take up the challenge. If this were to be done, it would convey a rather serious political message. I do not think this would cast a positive light on the creation of a government coalition that denies - but in this manner would be clearly proving—that the previous regime is being restored.

This is dangerous not only for the HDUR but for other parties—because it should be known that the Peasants' Party, for example, clearly sees the state form of monarchy as a solution, a political alternative, for Romania. If the HDUR must not talk about local governments since this is not expressly stated in the Constitution, then the Peasants' Party likewise must not talk about monarchy.

I believe this is a process. If it has begun, it must be treated as a process. That is why the operative council [HDUR coordination council] considered the current situation to be extremely grave: because great pressure has been exerted on the state's democratic institutions, the independence of parties, and the free expression of opinions by the parties. Thus, the basic condition of political liberalism, of political expression both in the press and within the parties, has been endangered. [end recording]

Romanian Minister Seeks To Meet With Kovacs

LD2401145095 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungary's foreign minister has said that the anti-Hungarian statements of certain Bucharest government members and party leaders threaten the very existence of the Hungarian minority in Romania.

Laszlo Kovacs held talks with Viorel Hrebenciuc, secretary general of the Romanian Government, in Budapest. He raised all the issues that cause serious problems in bilateral relations. He pointed out that the attacks against the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania run counter to the two countries' interests and also damage Bucharest's international image.

According to a report from Bucharest, Romania's foreign minister wants to meet his Hungarian counterpart on 1 February in Strasbourg, at the signing ceremony of the Council of Europe's general agreement on minority protection.

Kovacs: Banning HDUR Would Harm Romania

LD2501101595 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0900 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarian foreign minister [Laszlo Kovacs] has said that the Romanian Government cannot afford to really ban the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [HDUR] because that would unleash an international storm. Kovacs said on the [Hungarian] television program "Sunrise" that at their discussion yesterday, the secretary general of the Romanian Government [Viorel Hrebenciuc] categorically stated that he does not approve of the crude attacks that have been leveled at the HDUR.

Kovacs said Hrebenciuc knows precisely how much the fact that documents urging the outlawing of the HDUR and the Romanian population exchange have already gotten out to the West is harming Romania.

Goncz Receives Visiting Deputies From Slovakia

LD2401160495 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1500 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Hungarian President Arpad Goncz, to have good relations with its

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neighbors in in the interest not only of Hungary but also of Hungarian communities living in these countries. Goncz said this upon meeting a delegation of ethnic Hungarian parliamentary deputies from Slovakia.

The president also stressed that the Hungarian Government must hold talks with the people who were democratically elected in Slovakia. According to Goncz, Hungary is interested in concluding a basic treaty that includes obligations an account of which can be demanded later, and that is in keeping with European standards. He added: It is inevitable that the view of Hungarians in Slovakia also be taken into consideration in the course of preparing the document.

Slovak Hungarian Leader Views Ethnic Program

LD2501114895 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0600 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Miklos Duray, leader of the [ethnic Hungarian] Coexistence Movement of Slovakia, the Pozsony [Bratislava] government program is restricting the Hungarian community's [magyarsag] room for maneuver.

At a meeting [yesterday in Budapest] of representatives of Slovakia's Hungarian parties and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian National Assembly, Duray emphatically pointed out that [Slovak Prime Minister] Meciar's program restricts the use of the Hungarian language and withholds support from Hungarian culture. This policy will eventually cause the minorities to disappear and lead to a totalitarian nation-state, Slovakia's ethnic Hungarian politician said.

Slovak Prime Minister Welcomed to Budapest

LD2501121295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We begin our detailed reports with the program of Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, who has been in our country since last night. The Slovak guest was given a festive welcome at 0945 by his host, Prime Minister Gyula Horn, on Kossuth Square [in Budapest]; and the plenary session started at 1000. The ministers of foreign affairs, industry, transport, and environmental protection of both sides were present. Ildiko Nagy reports from parliament:

[Nagy] From the composition of the delegations, one can conclude that the issues of environmental protection and economy will be given emphasis at today's discussions. Gyula Horn greeted the guests, expressing special thanks to Vladimir Meciar for finding time for the visit despite his busy schedule.

In his reply the Slovak prime minister said he attaches great significance to the fact that it is in Hungary that he is able to begin his first bilateral discussions as head of government. He invited Gyula Horn to pay a return visit.

This is all the press has been able to glean from the first moments of the meeting—because after these opening remarks the discussions continued behind closed doors.

At the time of this dispatch, Hungarian President Arpad Goncz and National Assembly Speaker Zoltan Gal are receiving the Slovak premier.

Ministry Probes Kalashnikov Smuggling Allegations

LD2401204895 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 24 Jan 95

[From the "Newsreel" program]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Defense Ministry has launched an investigation into the case of the machine pistols that were allegedly smuggled out of Hungary. The German TV company ZDF has in fact alleged that a consignment of Kalashnikovs seized in Germany was obtained in Hungary by Algerian extremists. Hungarian and German experts alike do not consider the smuggling affair to be serious.

[Correspondent] According to Newsreel information, an Algerian citizen living in Leipzig has bought over 50 unusable Kalashnikovs from Hungary—in other words, weapons usable only for ornamental purposes.

The leader of the Defense Ministry's Main Department for Military Technology and Procurement said that even weapons that are incapable of functioning can only be purchased or taken out of the country with the permission of the Export Supervision Office of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. [passage omitted]

The German Federal Bureau of Investigation is carrying out an investigation into the affair. According to experts, the case is also peculiar because the unusable weapons changed hands at 400 German marks each, while the cost of converting the ornamental Kalashnikov is over 1,000 marks. [passage omitted]

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Interior Minister: Recall by Walesa Unlikely

LD2101171695 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1438 GMT 21 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 21 Jan—I have full control over the MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Vistula Military Units, Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej Milczanowski says. Today he repeated again that he will resign should President Walesa demand this. According to Milczanowski, this is, however, rather unlikely.

During a meeting with a group of journalists at the MSW, Milczanowski was asked to comment on the rumor that the Vistula Military Units could be used by the Belweder in a crisis that could arise after a possible dissolution of parliament. "This rumor makes me laugh," the minister replied.

"There is no problem. As far as I know, I have been enjoying the full support of the president," the minister said when asked about the possibility of being recalled by the president. He added that he talked to Lech Walesa recently and that the matter was not "the main topic of the discussion."

The MSW is at present the only so-called presidential ministry where the minister with full powers is in charge. Milczanowski declined to say how he felt in a situation like that.

"Things are the way they are," is how the minister replied to the question of whether Zenon Smolarek, the chief commandant of the Police, has remained in his post thanks only to the present political arrangements. In October of last year, Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak did not accept Smolarek's resignation, submitted in connection with scandals in the Poznan police, and did not agree to replace him with Boguslaw Strzelecki, head of the Krakow police (supported by Lech Walesa).

Poll Confirms Popularity of SLD, PSL, UW

WS2501112095 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 14-15 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Renata Wrobel: "PBS Poll on Elections for RZECZPOSPOLITA: SLD Takes the Lead, PSL and UW Neck and Neck"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] is the strongest party of all, the Freedom Union [UW] dominates among the opposition parties, seven parties stand chances of entering the Sejm (the parties currently represented in parliament plus Solidarity), the right does not make the threshold—those would be the results of parliamentary elections had we voted in mid-December of last year and if votes split as they did in a poll carried out for us by the Social Research Laboratory [PBS].

SLD: Still in the Lead

The SLD fell below 20-percent support level only once in our polls since fall of 1993 (in January of last year). Despite fluctuations, the party continues to hold its number-one position in the polls, although its popularity does fall slightly at times (down to 20-21 percent, for example, in spring and late fall of last year). The left closed last year with a relatively huge success, collecting one vote in four.

The Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and UW: Almost a Tie

The PSL cannot boast of success resembling that of its coalition partner. Since last spring, this party was unable to gather more than 18 percent of the votes (usually 16-17 percent).

Recently UW, the strongest opposition party, has begun catching up with the PSL. UW, a party that was formed last spring when the Democratic Union [UD] and the Liberal-Democratic Congress [KLD] united, initially had far fewer supporting votes than the combined total of UD and KLD voters. The popularity of UW declined further in subsequent months, and only since July did its popularity begin to rise slightly.

Union of Labor [UP]—All Is Calm in the Middle of the List

Polls show that UP is a party from the center of the list that can look at a bright future. Even considering all possible sampling errors and misinterpretations, the 8-10 percent of supporters it has always had guarantees it a seat on the Sejm benches. UP has the most immutable constituency in Poland: Never since the parliamentary elections of 1993 did it receive less than 8 percent of support in our polls. UP leaders should not feel overly confident, however. There is the edifying example of the KLD, which was considered to have an exceptionally stable and loyal constituency for long months, and yet it failed in the parliamentary elections. Polish political life and the voting preferences of Poles remain largely unpredictable.

Solidarity—Still Safe

In November 1993, immediately after the elections, Solidarity had a mere 2 percent of support. Subsequent polls were much more in its favor, but Solidarity truly and steadily "took off" last summer. This was probably due to the citizen draft of the Constitution prepared by Solidarity and its success in gathering a huge number of signatures under the document. The popularity of Solidarity peaked in September only to be followed by a slight decline, yet still not below the relatively safe level of 8 percent. Besides, these differences are within limits of the sampling error.

Polls thus far did not indicate that the union owes its popularity with voters to its activities—for instance, the successful appeal to the president to veto bills Solidarity did not approve of, or protests of the public sector workers. The latter, in particular the spectacular hunger strikes, could have an impact on the January poll results, although it is difficult to say whether it will be positive or negative.

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Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN]—Surprisingly Well

Various reasons are usually given for the positions particular parties hold on popularity lists: their internal situation, program declarations, the overall situation. Sometimes, however, all of these interpretations seem farfetched. The best example of that is the KPN. This party, torn apart by internal conflicts meticulously reported by the media (even knives and guns were used in party quarrels), has been doing surprisingly well in our polls for several months now.

Of course, one may point out the visible activity of the KPN in tracking down scandals and wrongdoings, but this is only part of the truth. It is worth noting that, in the past, the KPN lost support whenever it made any noise and benefited from keeping a lower profile.

Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR]: No Guarantees

The KPN still remains within the group of parties whose parliamentary success is doubtful—6 or 7 percent of supporters does not suffice to be confident about securing seats. The BBWR is in a similar situation. The departure of the BBWR's leader, Professor Zbigniew Religa, who was quite popular with the Poles, so far has not affected the party's popularity in a negative way. It usually gets "its" 5 percent, but that result does not guarantee anything.

The Right: No Seats

There undoubtedly are Poles who would be willing to vote for the right. Proof of that is support for rightist candidates to local counsels in last year's regional elections. The weaknesses of the right include its huge dispersion, the instability of alliances formed thus far, and obvious problems with reaching agreement. The particular rightist blocs usually have minuscule support (even if the Alliance for Poland [PdP] does a bit better, the 8 percent threshold specified for alliances in the electoral regulations will remain out of reach). One may wonder how long the rightist constituents will be patient and whether they will lend their support to parties that have greater chances of winning in the elections or join those who do not intend to vote.

One may also speculate if and how Solidarity's participation in the process of unification on the right will affect the results of electoral opinion polls. Experience shows that, at least in the initial stage, this influence need not necessarily be positive. Some voters approach new coalitions and alliances with distrust.

Not Everyone Votes in the Same Way

Sometimes one may get the impression that Polish political parties do not really know what type of voter they would like to target, or even that they want to target everyone. Meanwhile, it is obvious that the popularity of the particular parties varies depending on the constituency groups. Several examples:

—Young people tend to vote for UP more often than any other voters and are the least inclined to vote for the SLD.

—Every third high school and university student would vote for UW.

—More than half of the people with higher education would vote for UW or the SLD, whereas the former is definitely more popular with this group.

—One-half of the inhabitants of large cities would vote for the same two parties: UW and the SLD.

—One in four of the unemployed would vote for UP.

—Nearly half of the farmers would vote for the PSL, but only one in four inhabitants of rural areas.

—Solidarity is especially popular among the oldest age groups and among skilled manual workers.

Voter Moods Are Fickle

In comparison with polls carried out a year ago, the SLD has clearly lost support among people with higher education and management cadres posts. The losses were slightly lower among the lowest income groups and students. It is supported by twice as many farmers and housewives than before, slightly more old-age pensioners and private entrepreneurs.

The PSL has gained many new supporters among the lowest income groups and school and university students. It has lost the support of farmers (down by 10 percentage points), and, to a lesser extent, of women and skilled manual workers.

As far as UW, ranked third, is concerned, support in terms of particular voter groups hardly changes and remains stable.

Faithful and Disloyal Voters

Still one year ago, 85 percent of those who had voted for the SLD would do so again. Today, 72 percent of the left's constituents declare their readiness to cast their votes in the same way. The loyalty of the PSL constituency may also be said to measure 72 percent. Solidarity and KPN voters make similar claims. Two-thirds of former UD supporters and slightly more than one-half of KLD voters have transferred their sympathies to UW.

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General Voting Preferences

	Oct 94	Nov 94	Dec 94
	(in percent)		
SLD	23	21	25
UW	16	17	17
PSL	16	17	16
Solidarity	9	9	8
UP	9	9	10
KPN	6	7	6
BBWR	4	5	5
PdP	7	3	5

Voting Preferences of Chosen Constituency Groups

(in percent)

	UW	UP	SLD	PSL	Solidarity
People between ages 18 and 24	18	17	17		
People over age 60			25	21	14
People with elementary education	13		23	26	
People with higher education	35	9	23		
Lowest income group		12	14	34	
Highest income group	30	11	24		
The unemployed	9	23	21		9
Management cadres	34	14	19		
Private entrepreneurs	19		28	11	
Farmers			21	49	8

The text was based on monthly polls on voting preferences carried out for RZECZPOSPOLITA by PBS. The last poll was carried out on 17-18 December on a group of 1,032 people representative of the adult population of Poland. Each respondent had 100 points to allocate according to their own voting preferences (the respondents granted 100 points to the party they would personally vote for; when torn between several parties, they split the points among them; if they stated definitely that they would not vote, they attributed their 100 points to that response, etc.). The sampling error is plus or minus 2.5 percent.

Poll Shows Kwasniewski, SLD Most Popular

WS2401155195 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 24 Jan 95 p 3

[Article by R.W.: "Election Poll by CBOS; Presidential Unknowns"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The party that would have the greatest number of supporters right now in parliamentary elections is the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. The most popular candidates for president are Aleksander Kwasniewski, Lech Walesa, and Jacek Kuron. As many as three-fourths of Poles declare that they would "certainly" vote in the presidential elections; over 60 percent say that they would definitely cast their votes in the parliamentary elections. The opinion poll was carried out by the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS].

Research by this center shows that the support the political parties would obtain in January would be similar to the support they could count on in December of last year. The best results would be achieved by the SLD (19 percent of those who would vote), the Polish Peasant Party (14 percent), the Freedom Union (13 percent), "Solidarity" (12 percent), the Union of Labor (10 percent), and the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms (5 percent). Only these groupings would win seats in the Sejm if the results of the poll turned out to be the actual results of parliamentary elections. The strongest rightist bloc, the Covenant for Poland, would obtain 6 percent of the votes. However, because it is a coalition, it would not be enough to win seats in the Sejm (under the Electoral Law that is currently in force, a coalition must obtain 8 percent of the votes).

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The majority of people who are most often referred to as possible serious candidates for president lost some popularity in January. Aleksander Kwasniewski has been at the top of the list for months now; however, never in the last half year has he achieved smaller support than he has now. Waldemar Pawlak has lost half of the "presidential" voters since September 1994. Poles differ quite a lot as far as their candidates for president are concerned. The five most popular candidates did not collect even 50 percent of the "votes." Professor Adam Strzembosz, who is most frequently referred to as the candidate of rightist groupings, is supported by merely 3 percent of the voters for the time being. The number of people who are undecided as to whom to support i the presidential elections has doubled since December (right now 21 percent of the respondents).

Every fifth Pole supposes that the new president will be Aleksander Kwasniewski, 12 percent say it will be Walesa, and 8 percent suppose it will be Jacek Kuron. More than 30 percent are unable to say who is most likely to win the elections.

Whom would you most readily support in the presidential election?

	Dec 94	Jan 95
	(in percent)	
Aleksander Kwasniewski	17	14
Lech Walesa	13	11
Jacek Kuron	11	10
Tadeusz Zielinski	9	9
Andrzej Olechowski	9	7
Waldemar Pawlak	8	6
Jozef Oleksy	2	5
Leszek Balcerowicz	4	4
Hanna Suchocka	5	3
Adam Strzembosz	—	3

* * *

The CBOS research was carried out between 6 and 9 January on a 1,230-person representative random sample of adult inhabitants of Poland.

Civil Rights Spokesman May Run for President

WS2501114995 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 25 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by Danuta Frey: "Professor Tadeusz Zielinski: I Do Not Rule Out Running for President"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Professor Tadeusz Zielinski, spokesman for civil rights, does not rule out the possibility of running for president. However, his decision will depend on many circumstances—primarily on critical developments on the political scene that should occur within the next few weeks. If he decides to run, he will be a nonaligned candidate. He will be above all divisions, the spokesman stated during a news conference held on 24 January in Warsaw. [passage omitted]

Right-Wing Parties' Efforts Toward Unity Seen

MM2501084495 Poznan GAZETA POZNANSKA in Polish 14-15 Jan 95 p 3

[Article by Marek Magierowski and Roman St. Zielinski under the rubric "Event of the Week": "The Latin Method"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Polish Right has not known unity since 1917. This conference will be the first serious step toward unification," Janusz Korwin-Mikke, leader of the Union for Real Politics [UPR], prophesies.

Today in Warsaw two right-wing coalitions are meeting at an appointed time and place: the Alliance for Poland [PdP] and the 11th November Compact [P11L]. Between them, they embrace 10 different right-oriented groups. Invitations to attend the conference were extended to Solidarity trade unionists and representatives of the right-wing parties associated in the tiny Secretariat for Center-Right Parties. The conference is to be concluded by the signing of a final document, which is expected to create real opportunities for consolidating the Right within a single bloc.

The Birth of Party Blocs

It was not until after they suffered a painful defeat in the 19 September 1993 parliamentary election that the leaders of the right-wing parties felt compelled to consolidate their forces. In the fall of the same year, the P11L was created, at first grouping together four right-wing parties: UPR, the Party of Christian Democrats [PChD], the Conservative Party [PK], and the Christian Peasant Party [SLCh]. Later, the Party of National Democracy [SND] joined the bloc. Then, in the spring of 1994, three other parties set up the PdP group. To begin with, these were Center Accord [PC], the Christian-National Union [ZChN], and the Movement for the Republic [RdR]. The PdP soon expanded by embracing the Conservative Coalition [KK], a splinter group originally within the PK, which eventually left the P11L.

According to ZChN leader Ryszard Czarnecki, the creation of these two blocs was the first step toward a consolidation of the whole right-wing camp. However, cooperation between the PdP and the P11L did not proceed well from the very beginning. Moreover, both of these groups were being eroded by internal conflicts. For example, Kazimierz Ujazdowski left the P11L along with his KK group to join the PdP, justifying that move with the argument that only the latter bloc was capable of bringing about an acceleration of the unification process.

Differences and Conflicts

1. The President

The principal factor that set individual party leaders at loggerheads with one another was their attitude toward

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the president of the Polish Republic. In September of last year, discussing the right-wing camp's future presidential candidate, PC leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski insisted: "Under no circumstances will Lech Walesa be nominated as our candidate," (and this view is also supported by UPR). However, soon afterward, ZChN leader Ryszard Czarnecki asserted in an interview: "We will certainly support Walesa should a postcommunist candidate run against him in the second stage of the election," (and his opinion is endorsed by PChD activists). The conflict between the proponents of the pro-Belweder and anti-Belweder options became more pronounced when RdR chairman Romuald Szeremietiew expressed a keen interest in assuming the office of national defense minister—sure enough, to be appointed by Walesa. Kaczynski was outraged at the stand taken by his partner and colleague from the PdP. He even went as far as demanding that the RdR be removed from the PdP coalition. But Szeremietiew gained a defender in Czarnecki, who said: "This is not the time for expelling anyone; it is the time for attracting new members." At present, attempts are being made to promote a new presidential candidate. New names appear on the working list regularly and disappear from it at the same rate. The one repeated most often is that of Supreme Court First President Adam Strzembosz. But so far he has not given his consent. It is public knowledge that President Strzembosz would like to see more widespread support for his candidacy coming also from, say, the ranks of the Union of Freedom [UW].

2. Anticommunism

Another area of discord was the parties' position on the question of the so-called active anticommunism. In October Kaczynski and Ujazdowski spoke of "two centers that do not realize the principle of practical anticommunism: the RdR and the UPR." The UPR, together with its chairman, Janusz Korwin-Mikke, was "taken to task" for the local (and short-lived) association with the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] within the working structure of the Warsaw City Council. Another conflict flared up against the background of the compact struck up between the right-wing camp and UW. The UPR and ZChN heads criticized Kaczynski, Aleksander Hall of the PK, and Artur Balazs of the SLCh for having conducted talks with UW on the subject of appointing a joint candidate for president. It is still not known today, at the very last moment before the meeting, whether an agreement will finally be reached between 10 or eight participating members, in the latter case without the parties headed by Hall and Balazs.

3. Solidarity

On the day of the conference, the participants' attitude toward Solidarity remains an open question. The majority of the parties declare in favor of cooperation with the union. However, the UPR, for one, points out that the text of the constitution as proposed by the union (and supported by certain right-wingers) contains provisions contrary to the agreements reached so far between the two blocs. At the same time, it is necessary to stress that the foremost UPR figures have recently restricted their anti-trade-union rhetoric to a remarkable degree. Moreover, a proportion of the right wing's leaders do not believe that trade unionists can be good long-term partners and fear an eventual conflict of interest.

4. The Separatists

On top of everything else, an obstacle of a "social" nature is in evidence here. Not everyone is equally enamored of certain figures grouped in the Secretariat for Center-Right Parties. According to Kaczynski, it is a hotbed of separatists, who "have it in their nature" to instigate splits in political parties everywhere. Those more inclined toward appeasement insist that it would be better to accept the Secretariat into the fold because, if it is left outside, it will "stir up trouble and set out to create some very strange configurations." The Secretariat leaders have gained a degree of notoriety for their eager attendance at meetings with Father Jozef Maj of St. Katarzyna's, ostensibly "to earn God's blessings."

Seeking St. Katarzyna's Patronage

The history of the meetings at St. Katarzyna's Parish in Warsaw goes back to November 1994. Since the beginning of this year, the talks hosted at the parish by Father Maj have been particularly intensive, so much so that a kind of initial "goodwill declaration" has apparently been signed there. Since then, there has been talk of parties grouped within the "St. Katarzyna's Conventicle." Some politicians have believed that this development is of little significance. PK leader Aleksander Hall even declared, "I do not attach undue importance to the meetings at St. Katarzyna's" and said that he regards them as merely a certain type of discussion forum. Hall sets all his hopes on today's meeting. "We promote the Latin method of integration around a statute and a program, not the Asian one consisting in grouping all the existing forces around a single leader," Janusz Korwin-Mikke declares. And it certainly does appear that the Right has finally opted for that particular form of the unification process.

Solidarity Head Assails Coalition's 'Greediness'

LD2401225295 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2200 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Solidarity Chairman Marian Krzaklewski believes that the union will support the president if he dissolves the parliament legally.

[begin Krzaklewski recording] The decisionmaking arrangement in the parliament must be changed to a real, genuine one because the current arrangement does not reflect the true disposition of social or political power in Poland. I believe that the mandate and all the possibilities have been exhausted; this is a result of this coalition's great greediness. They thought that because they had acquired so much power, first and foremost because of the electoral law rather than overwhelming social

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support, they would be able to deprive the presidential as well as other extraparliamentary institutions of the exercise of power. [end recording]

[Announcer] During a break in the proceedings of the presidium of the Solidarity National Commission, Marian Krzaklewski announced that tomorrow the union will be talking to President Lech Walesa about privatization. [passage omitted]

ZYCIE WARSZAWY Employees May Strike

WS2501121495 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 25 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by M.U.: "Staff of ZYCIE WARSZAWY Threatens To Stage a Strike"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Employees of ZYCIE WARSZAWY decided in a referendum that, unless Nicola Grauso, proprietor of the newspaper, begins talks with representatives of the daily's "Solidarity" ["S"] by the end of the week, they will stage a protest; they can even go on strike. Out of over 200 employees of the company, 122 persons voted for, and only four were against.

"We support the position taken by the editorial collegium, which criticized the publishing policy of the daily's owner," said Bronislaw Wildstein, chairman of "S" at ZYCIE WARSZAWY. "We believe that raising the price of the daily, accompanied by decreasing its volume, is an activity aimed at destroying the newspaper."

The "S" in ZYCIE WARSZAWY has also submitted wage demands. For a year now there have not been any wage rises to offset inflation. The union also demands that working conditions be improved and that Grauso reach a collective agreement with the employees. A representative of the National Labor Inspectorate, who examined the condition of the building that houses ZYCIE WARSZAWY offices, evaluated it very critically. The unionists asked the Labor Ministry to delegate a ministerial negotiator to their company. Wildstein says that the staff of ZYCIE WARSZAWY can even stop publishing the daily.

The troubles at ZYCIE WARSZAWY began about the time Nicola Grauso failed to obtain a nationwide broadcasting license for his "Polonia 1" television network. He announced that he wanted to retreat from Poland, which meant selling the daily. It was already known in May that he was holding trade negotiations with the Norwegian Orkla concern. In September the group of possible buyers included, among others, the press mogul Rupert Murdoch and Universal, a Polish company.

The talks with Orkla failed to produce any results because, according to unofficial information, Grauso wanted too much for the daily. In an interview for RZECZPOSPOLITA, the Norwegians themselves stated that they had not yet given up trying to buy the paper. Unofficially, ZYCIE WARSZAY journalists suppose that the Italian businessman will stop at nothing and may sell the daily to Universal. A few months ago, he made a commitment in front of the staff that he would not make any transaction without the consent of his partners, even though he owns a definite majority (97 percent) of the shares. He meant chiefly the company of the daily's editor in chief, Tomasz Wolek—Varsovia Press.

Financial Losses From Stationing of Russian Troops

LD2401232195 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1851 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Warsaw, 24 Jan—According to data of 1993, the losses suffered by Poland as a result of the stationing on its territory of Soviet and subsequently Russian troops amount to over 62.5 trillion old zlotys.

The cost of recultivation of the 70,000 hectares of land that were used by the Russian troops may come to over 52 trillion old zlotys.

This information is contained in a report approved by the Council of Ministers on 24 January. The report was prepared by Major General Zdzislaw Ostrowski, government plenipotentiary for the stationing of the Russian troops in Poland, who is about to end his mission.

During a break in the government meeting, the general told journalists that the Polish authorities never knew exactly how many Soviet or Russian soldiers were present in Poland. It is estimated that in 1945 there were about 100,000 soldiers stationed in 170 garrisons, and in 1992 60,000 in 59 garrisons. The last Russian soldier left Poland on 18 September 1993.

The Russian soldiers left behind 7,854 buildings of various kinds that needed, and most still need, minor or major renovation. [passage omitted]

The general said that the Soviet troops had stored nuclear weapons on three military sites—in Gorzow, Koszalin, and Pila provinces. Detailed tests have ruled out radioactivity in those areas. The general added that, during the period when the troops were stationed in Poland, there were 550 claims for compensation filed by the Polish side with regard to the deaths of Polish citizens caused by the activity of the troops. Two hundred people are receiving pensions in lieu of damage suffered by them.

Gen. Ostrowski said that, in accordance with an agreement signed between Poland and Russia in 1992, the Polish side is entitled to compensation amounting to only 290 billion old zlotys. [passage omitted]

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Spokesman on Canceled Talks With Goncz, Horn

AU2501132095 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Here is a press release from the government's spokesman:

The Romanian Government spokesman emphasizes that the failure of the meetings between Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn, Hungarian President Arpad Goncz, and Mr. Viorel Hrebenciuc, general secretary of Romania's Government, to take place is not a problem of Romania's Government, but a matter exclusively pertaining to the schedule of the hosts. Consequently, any attempt to attach out-of-context significance to this circumstantial fact and to link it to the ensemble of Romanian-Hungarian relations is groundless—the press release received from the Romanian Government spokesman concludes.

Budapest on Failure

LD2501132995 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1300 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] President Iliescu sent a message to Gyula Horn through the Romanian Government's secretary-general for minority affairs, but because the Hungarian prime minister did not receive him, he did not receive the message either.

This was announced by the Bucharest spokesman for foreign affairs. He said Iliescu wanted to emphasize that he is striving for exemplary, good-neighborly relations and cooperation with Hungary.

He also wished to inform the Hungarian side that Romania wants to respect the international norms relating to the rights and duties of national minorities, the Bucharest foreign affairs spokesman said.

The Romanian government spokesman did not ascribe any significance to the fact that the scheduled meetings did not take place. In his view, the cancelation of the discussions was connected exclusively with the programs of the hosts and they do not affect Romanian-Hungarian relations as a whole.

Iliescu, Spain's Gonzalez View Relations

AU2501141795

[FBIS Editorial Report] Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian at 1115 GMT on 25 January begins a 50-minute live relay from Cotroceni Palace in Bucharest on a news briefing by Romanian President Ion Iliescu and visiting Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez. Reception is good.

At the beginning of the joint news conference, Iliescu and Gonzalez make two brief statements. Iliescu welcomes "with great satisfaction" the visit to Romania of Felipe Gonzalez, "whom we perceive as a friend of Romania." After referring to the "traditionally good" ties between the two countries and Spain's "active position toward Romania after the 1989 revolution," Iliescu praises Gonzalez's "constant support for Romania in the European institutions." Iliescu reiterates his country's interest in expanding bilateral economic ties, in view of Romania's concern with economic reform, as well as the bilateral cooperation at the European and international level.

Gonzalez, speaking in Spanish with passage-by-passage Romanian translation, begins his statement by thanking Iliescu for the opportunity to visit Romania. He says that the "overall framework of our relations is very positive" and expresses understanding for Romania's aspiration to "join the European structures, out of economic, political, and security grounds." As for Spain, it is ready to "support these Romanian strivings and expand bilateral cooperation."

The question and answer session begins at 1127 GMT. In answer to a question about the Yugoslav and Chechen conflicts, Iliescu says that Romania is "vitally and directly interested in the political settlement of the Yugoslav conflict"; consequently, it supports all initiatives along these lines. Since it enjoys good ties with all the republics of former Yugoslavia, Romania has done its best to "facilitate communication and dialogue among the parties" and to support the efforts of the international community. He adds that "Prime Minister Gonzales has met with the Spanish members of the WEU team at Calafat, with the assistance of whom we are implementing the embargo." Iliescu does not believe that a bilateral Romanian- Spanish initiative can bring anything new in this respect; rather, he thinks that the two countries should continue to "support the multilateral efforts under way in Yugoslavia" for a political solution to the conflict. Regarding the events in Chechnya, Iliescu says that they are "an expression the fragile political stability of the Russian Federation," with "negative effects on the overall situation." He calls for a political settlement of the crisis, in the interest of "consolidating democracy in Russia."

Gonzalez greets Romania's "flexible position favoring talks regarding the Yugoslav crisis," after which he mentions the fact that "the members of the Spanish Civil Guards battalion are very pleased with their cooperation with Romanian authorities" in monitoring the FRY embargo on the Danube River. He agrees that "there is no need for us to come with new initiatives in Yugoslavia," but rather "we should do everything possible to implement the existing ones." Regarding Chechnya, Gonzalez expresses the hope that the crisis will be resolved "through dialogue, not confrontation."

Answering a question about bilateral economic relations, Gonzalez says that he favors a "flux of investments" from Spain and the West, since "Romania's geostrategic position will lead to an increase in its development and consumption possibilities."

Asked about his opinion of the Spanish political model, Iliescu praises the "success of the Spanish political life in

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overcoming certain moments of great internal tension" during the transition from a totalitarian regime to democracy. Referring to the Spanish experience and the "pact concluded between the political forces there to promote the national interest," Iliescu said "we have also tried to promote the idea of a political pact in our country, as a minimal platform for cooperation among the political forces in Romania; unfortunately, we failed in our strivings." Nevertheless, Iliescu adds that he noticed the emergence of a certain "consensus" among the political forces in Romania on matters pertaining to the "European and Euro-Atlantic integration."

In conclusion, Iliescu and Gonzalez thank the audience for attending the news conference. The news conference ends at 1205 GMT.

Gonzalez on Integration

LD2401233095 Madrid RNE-1 Radio Network in Spanish 2200 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Felipe Gonzalez has been in Romania since this afternoon. His visit should have been paid last May, when it was postponed as a result of the flight of Luis Roldan. One of the main aims of this visit was to meet the Civil Guard unit carrying out a mission for the West European Union in the region to prevent arms trafficking to Bosnia. A report from our special correspondent, Pedro Fernandez Cespedes:

[Fernandez Cespedes] At last the prime minister was tonight able to fulfill the outstanding commitment he had with the Civil Guard unit monitoring the arms embargo against Serbia and Montenegro on the Danube, a commitment he was not able to fulfill because of the Roldan crisis in April last year. [passage omitted]

Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez concluded the first day of his visit to Bucharest by having dinner with Romanian Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu. This was the second meeting today between the two heads of government, and during the toasts there was a clear speech by Prime Minister Gonzalez presenting Spain as a friendly and loyal country which firmly supports Romania in this country's integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic organizations. Felipe Gonzalez stressed here the positive culture of pacts and consensus in our transition [from dictatorship to democracy], a culture which can be recommended to Romania because, as Felipe Gonzalez said during the toasts, in democracy there is no turning back.

Iliescu on NATO, Economy, Gonzalez Visit

BR2401162895 Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA in Spanish 23 Jan 95 p 4

[Interview with Romanian President Ion Iliescu by Ricardo Estarriol in Bucharest; date not given: "Shock Therapy To Change Country's Economic Structure Is Not Working"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bucharest—In Romanian President Ion Iliescu's opinion, the cause of the "political reservations" which many countries have been maintaining with respect to postcommunist Romania has been not so much the country's domestic situation as "the overall situation in the area." Iliescu, who prefers to speak of "reservations" and not "isolation," believes that 1994 was a "European year" for Romania, with many multilateral contacts, aimed especially at European integration, NATO, the Council of Europe, and the Western European Union. Following the Essen meeting with the six countries associated with the European Union [EU], Romania "must now determine its strategy."

Iliescu, who, if matters do not change, has a good chance of being reelected president for a third term in the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections, believes that there is an atmosphere favorable to Romania in the world today, and that it has been achieved among the political forces on a common foreign policy platform.

[Estarriol] According to what President Yeltsin said at the Budapest European summit, Russia does not approve of the former Warsaw Pact countries' joining NATO. How does this opposition affect Romania's aim of joining NATO?

[Iliescu] We had already joined the so-called Partnership for Peace. In fact, we have already taken part in operations in Poland and in the Black Sea, and want full integration, but, at the same time, we realize that NATO must not be a threat for Russia, in accordance with what is stipulated in the Paris Charter (of the CSCE), which states that no country will regard the others as enemies. And we regard our future NATO membership as a step in this direction, toward a strategic and security balance in this part of Europe.

[Estarriol] I can still remember the postrevolutionary enthusiasm for reunification with Moldova which existed in Romania. At that time, there was talk of a bridge of flowers which should unite the two parts of the fraternal Romanian nation across the River Prut. Now nobody talks about that any longer. What has happened?

[Iliescu] There has been no change in this respect in Romania, because the Romanians of Moldova really are our brothers. They won their independence in 1991, and seceded from the USSR, but then changes occurred there owing to strong pressure from the Russian- speaking group and the enormous dependence which the country had and still has on Russia and Ukraine. The Chisinau leaders have also revived the theory that the Moldovans belong to another nationality, other than the Romanian nationality. But I believe that life itself will change matters. We no longer talk about that now because we do not wish to exaggerate the problems.

[Estarriol] What are the Romanian economy's prospects? There is a great deal of talk about privatization, but the large enterprises remain, as formerly, in the state's hands...

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[Iliescu] Reforming the economy is a difficult matter. Adjusting a political system to democracy is easier, but economic systems have much greater inertia. The famous shock economy is not working. How much we would have preferred to do everything in a year! But the reform entails a complete change of all the legislation, and our parliament is doing nothing but approve new laws, but many things still remain to be changed in the economy. How can we speak of a developed economy if there are no developed banks? We currently have 28 banks, which are not enough to meet the needs of the half a million new economic agents which have emerged in the country. The same thing can be said of the stock exchange, which is at an initial stage. We have abolished the central (planning) bodies, but people still turn to the government to resolve their problems. The process is complex and difficult.

[Estarriol] I was referring to the privatization of the large enterprises...

[Iliescu] Well, under the 1991 law, 800 small and medium-sized enterprises were privatized in accordance with the so-called "English system"; that is, making the employees and workers owners, but the problem is that capital is lacking. Some 30 percent of the capital would be distributed in the form of certificates, which would be distributed among the population, in a manner similar to how it has been done in the Czech Republic. With these certificates it would later be possible to buy shares. In order to cover the remaining 70 percent of the capital, there are three sources. The first is citizens themselves, who are holding more and more capital. Second, there are half a million private enterprises which are also a source of capital accumulation. And, third, there is foreign capital. So far, $1.2 billion have been invested in 30,000 joint ventures. Enterprises such as Siemens, Alcatel, Japanese and South Korean enterprises, and so forth are working here.

[Estarriol] The West cannot understand how the settling of scores with the representatives of the old regime has ended. In fact, it is possible to see Nicu Ceausescu, whose prison sentence was commuted on health grounds, driving in a sports car through Bucharest.

[Iliescu] There is an emotional element which prevents a realistic judgment. I believe that matters will develop in such a way that the real situation can be known. We believe that we will reach a situation similar to that of Spain, in which the chapter of the past can be closed. There is still a large amount of accumulated hatred, and we have not found a common language.

[Estarriol] What expectations do you have of Felipe Gonzalez' visit?

[Iliescu] I hope that the talks will enable us to draw up a plan to use Spain's experiences in Romania, because there are many similarities between the two countries, and I am not referring solely to Trajan, the Roman emperor of Spanish origin who romanized Dacia. I have had the Moncloa Pact translated, and have distributed it among all the politicians in Romania. Of course, we do not wish to copy, because each country has its own conditions. We are also very interested in the Spanish experience of integration in the EU.

Deputies' Control of Secret Services Advocated

AU2401131895 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 19 Jan 95 p 3

[Article by Doina Baesu: "Deputy Gh. Gorun Continues Actions Aimed at Expanding Parliamentary Control Over All Secret Services"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the Standing Bureau of the Chamber of Deputies had rejected the legal initiative proposed by Gheorghe Gorun to place all information services in Romania under parliamentary control, the PAC [Civic Alliance Party] deputy is thinking of other variations. In fact, other members of the Commission in Charge of the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] Control are preoccupied with this issue, because all of them, including Vasile Vacaru [Social Democracy Party of Romania], agree that the other six information services that are operating outside the SRI have to be controlled. The fact that the SRI exercises greater control on parliamentarians than the other way around, is another matter. In any event, the members of the commission agreed with Virgil Magureanu [SRI director] when he complained that it is only he who is being controlled, while all the other services do what they want and trample him underfoot.

The variation that Mr. Gorun, together with the other members of the commission, is currently studying is the one used by the United States. In the United States, there is an "intelligence community" and that "community," which includes all the U.S. secret services, is under the supervision of the two committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Certainly, there the services also trample each other underfoot, but at least all of them are being controlled. In our case, the body corresponding to this "community" is the Supreme Defense Council. However, there is no interest in having it under parliamentary supervision. For the time being, it is under Ion Iliescu's jurisdiction. And he wants it to remain this way. Therefore, when a possible law in this respect will be debated by the parliament, the representatives of the respective secret services, probably through all their means will oppose being transferred under parliamentary control, as is normal in any democracy. Mr. Gorun believes that this will influence the opinion of the majority, despite the fact that the president of the commission, Vasile Vacaru himself, has just returned from the United States convinced that all secret services must be under control.

Minister: 'Sufficient Reasons' To Ban UDMR

AU2401185495 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 21-22 Jan 95 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Gavril Chiuzbaian Considers That the UDMR Can Be Banned"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] Iosif Gavril Chiuzbaian, the minister of justice, considers that there are sufficient reasons to commence procedures to ban the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania]. In an ample exclusive statement made on Friday [20 January] to the MEDIAFAX news agency Minister Chiuzbaian reviewed the anticonstitutional actions of the UDMR leaders. We would like to point out that the statement made by Chiuzbaian comes as support for the decisions made by the leadership of the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] and the PDAR [Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania] calling for the outlawing of the UDMR as an unconstitutional political party.

CDR's Constantinescu Calls For Party Unity

AU2501105695 Bucharest EXPRES MAGAZIN in Romanian No 2 17-24 Jan 95 p 5

[Interview with Professor Emil Constantinescu, president of the Democratic Convention of Romania, by Ileana Lucaciu in Bucharest on 13 January: "Overcoming the Crisis Presupposes Concrete Measures, not Doctrines"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

"Petty Vanity Is Pointless"

At an extraordinary news conference on Friday, 13 January, Professor Emil Constantinescu, president of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR], made a statement on his own behalf. Before leaving for a three-day visit to Geneva to attend a meeting of the Steering Committee of the Conference of European Rectors, Emil Constantinescu granted us an exclusive interview on the subject of the above-mentioned statement.

[Lucaciu] At the beginning of your personal statement, you say: "The seriousness of the situation in Romania, generated by the inability of the current government to solve the dramatic problems facing the economy and society, obliges the CDR to take decisive, clear, and firm political action." Please comment on this statement and on the decision to put an end to the internal struggles within the convention for the post of president.

[Constantinescu] When I say that Romania is in a difficult situation, I am not referring only to present realities as they are painfully perceived by everybody, such as the rapid increase in prices, administrative abuses, the economic inefficiency of the enterprises, the growth in unmarketable production, and the blocking of the privatization process by administrative bureaucratic actions. There are also much more serious problems pertaining to Romania's future. It is obvious that there is no strategy for the country's economic and social development. In the beginning, the Vacaroiu team, which has been in power for two years, came up with a draft strategy that it did not observe anyway. It did not provide answers to basic problems. How is Romania's economy to evolve? How will management and leadership improve? How will the laws of the market economy work, the only laws that can ensure profit both for the people working in the respective enterprises and the national budget? In the two years since the elections, Romania has covered an important distance on its way to European integration and has joined Western structures. Everybody admits that the opposition has played a special role in this integration. It has supported, prepared, and facilitated this integration. The institutional stage is now practically over, the only remaining problem being that of effective integration in the economic and financial structures, in order to level out extant social discrepancies. If this effective integration is not accomplished in the next two years, everything gained so far risks being lost. That is why, even though the opposition is not in power and does not have a majority in Parliament, it is dutybound to present to the citizens a strategy for the future based on concrete solutions. At the same time, the opposition must prove to the people that it has people capable of implementing its program. We are not dealing here with a theoretical problem. The situation is pressing and we must take concrete action. This is the motivation for my action, whereby I hope to put an end to sterile disputes so that we can concentrate our forces on reality and the serious circumstances in which Romania finds itself.

[Lucaciu] How do you explain the fact that these sterile disputes regarding the election of the CDR president—who is also a candidate for the country's presidency—are starting now, when your mandate expires on 6 June 1995, according to protocol?

[Constantinescu] I believe this is an attempt by certain convention leaders to divert attention from the weakness of their own parties. They do not have the financial wherewithal because of the absence of a law on financing the parties; they have no adequate logistics, and they are also faced with a certain apathy from the people, who are more concerned with their daily troubles than politics, and are subjected to government pressure. However, I do not understand why they attempt to transfer their parties' inadequacies to the general level of the CDR, instead of working to strengthen the alliance?! Despite all internal discussions, the CDR still enjoys the people's trust. Its support can be broadened, thus implicitly extending support for each CDR member party. One notes that the parties most critical of the convention are those faced with internal difficulties.

[Lucaciu] Romania is currently experiencing a critical moment of crisis. In this situation, is this the right time to egotistically let political vanity play a part, or is there any point?

[Constantinescu] One can justify only one vanity, namely proving that Romania is capable of becoming a country with democratic institutions and a European standard of living and behavior. Any other petty vanity is pointless.

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"Confusion is State Policy"

[Lucaciu] Some people in the CDR talk about the need to establish certain doctrinal poles in the convention, such as liberal, christian-democratic, and social-democratic poles. Do you think that the electorate is able to perceive these doctrinal nuances today?

[Constantinescu] Personally, I do not believe that the citizens care about doctrines right now. This does not mean that the issue of doctrines should not be discussed and that the electorate should not be acquainted with the various doctrines. It is very important that doctrines be explained to people in a country where confusion is state policy. The population should be told a few essential things in this respect. Apropos doctrines, the people should be told that there is no country in the world where an alliance between social democratic parties and parties that openly propagate antisemitic, xenophobic, totalitarian, and extremist orientations can be found. It is also necessary to explain to them the differences between the savage liberalism of the beginning of the century and modern liberalism, which incorporates many concepts of civic society. Doctrinal explanations are necessary, but they can only become politically efficient in the long run. They will probably bear fruit only in the elections of the year 2000. For the time being, the reality is that the citizens, far from being interested in doctrinal differences, are not even interested in the general programs put forward by the various political groupings.

[Lucaciu] What do you think, in your capacity as politician, that the electorate cares about now?

[Constantinescu] The population is interested in concrete solutions for social and professional groups, as these groups have emerged in the last five years in our society. One can no longer apply general solutions for workers, peasants, and intellectuals. Various diversifications have developed within these large groups and new ones have emerged, such as the entrepreneurs. When we suggest solutions, we must think of specific groups. For instance, there is a need for a certain type of solutions for peasants in mountainous regions and another type of solutions for peasants in hilly areas and plains. They have different problems and interests. The same applies to industry: One can no longer view everything in en masse. Light industry can achieve profits rapidly and needs help. Solutions must be sought for the great industrial giants, which must be submitted to a process of reconstruction or restructuring. The private groups are confronted with different problems as a function of their importance. I can give you other examples along this line. It is necessary to radically change the way in which we have tackled all these problems. It is a mistake to strive to acquaint the citizens with general doctrines that have no support in the reality of Romanian society. One should take into consideration the reality in our country and, on this basis, adopt and reshape doctrinal patterns.

[Lucaciu] Your statement today, 13 January, will raise a storm within the CDR. Do you think that the problem of electing the CDR president will be solved before 28 February, as you suggest, in order to normalize the situation in the alliance?

[Constantinescu] If this problems is not clarified now, it will never be clarified. This is my opinion.

[Lucaciu] There is a Romanian saying that "long illness is tantamount to sure death." Let us hope that the sickness of jostling for positions will end. How do you envision the CDR's evolution when things quiet down?

[Constantinescu] When this happens, the united convention will be able to focus on the serious problems facing Romania. It will strive to establish closer contact of the political decision-taking structures through the agency of the CDR Executive Committee and Council, with its senators and deputies, with our mayors and councillors in the local administration, and with the county and municipal bodies.

[Lucaciu] Article 15, Paragraph "C" of the protocol stipulates: "The CDR president represents the convention in its relations with the authorities, mass media, parties, and organizations." Today, you again announced your candidacy for this position. What is your program?

[Constantinescu] Of course, I have and have had a program. When I deliver my activity report to the CDR Executive Committee and Council, I will present my actions so far as well as what I plan to do in the future. It would be incorrect to overlook certain important actions that I have undertaken during my mandate. To give an example, I will refer to the relationship with the CDR trade union and other trade unions. This relationship will be extended to other structures of civic society and other social categories such as physicians, farmers, and so forth. My program stipulates closer ties with the respective structures, because only in that way can we ensure a basis for party activity. My report and program will be published.

[Lucaciu] Those leaders that are concerned with the position of CDR president—which automatically means running for Romania's presidency—have released a profile of the would-be candidate. What kind of profile do you propose?

[Constantinescu] I welcome their attitude. Such a profile should be composed. I was selected on the basis of a profile proposed by University Solidarity and the Civic Alliance. I will present my viewpoints on the latest profile at a subsequent news conference. However, I consider two conditions essential for a candidate: absolute moral integrity—which should make him immune to any pressure and, why not say it openly, blackmail—and managerial capability, as proven in the past five years.

[Lucaciu] The Civic-Liberal alliance recently signed a protocol bearing the signature of four parties: the National Liberal Party [PNL], the Liberal Party '93

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[PL'93], the National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention [PNL-CD], and the Civic Alliance Party [PAC]. Some alliance leaders are challenging your leadership. How do you envision the future of the alliance?

[Constantinescu] I look at the alliance with justified hope, considering that the statements made by some of its leaders are less important in this respect. I believe that the public in general has noted my direct involvement in setting up a liberal pole in the CDR, which has gained in importance with the readmittance of the PNL to the convention. The PNL is a party with strong organizational structures at the national level and many representatives in administrative positions. Its electorate has always remained devoted to the CDR. The attempt to bring together all those with liberal views is very important and will also ensure the unity and efficiency of the convention. Regarding the leaders, one should never mistake personal views for the general orientation of the parties and particularly the orientation of the parties' supporters. To give a random example, I will take the case of PNL-CD President Nicolae Cerveni. He always emphasizes that his reservations about my leadership are strictly personal and do not represent his party's viewpoint. He also says that he will vote in accordance with his party's viewpoint.

[Lucaciu] With your statement today, you have actually launched a mini-electoral campaign. Two years from now, unless we have early elections, what will be the strategic points of the electoral campaign, in your opinion?

[Constantinescu] Corruption and the ability to ensure the efficient leadership of the country through the promotion of concrete solutions.

Reality Cannot Be Perceived From Official Automobiles

[Lucaciu] You ran for the presidency as an independent in the last elections. With your statement today, you are telling the country that you are going to run again. Will you stay independent or do you feel drawn to some party?

[Constantinescu] According to the Constitution, the presidential candidate must be an independent. I believe that this condition should be honestly observed. If you are elected the country's president, you must publicly resign from the party you belonged to previously. I prefer to stay independent.

[Lucaciu] Let us assume that you will have a new confrontation with Ion Iliescu. How do you view such a confrontation now, in the light of what happened in 1992?

[Constantinescu] I am better prepared for a confrontation with Ion Iliescu. When it was put to me that I should run in 1992, I asked for a night to think it over. Indeed, I thought a lot about it. I developed a general plan that comprised two points: recognition of the adversary's victory and a possible investiture discourse. I never commit myself to action unless I have developed a well-conceived, long-term strategy. I have learned a lot in the past two years, including from the experience and behavior of President Iliescu himself. In the event of a renewed electoral confrontation, I think that the advantage lies with me this time. One of the reasons for that is that Ion Iliescu will find it difficult to engage in a dialogue, as he long ago lost any contact with reality in his isolation at Cotroceni Palace. There is a great difference in the way reality is perceived between someone who travels in a 12-car motorcade, taking up the whole highway, and someone who travels by trolley bus, as I did today,

[Lucaciu] The analysts claim that Ion Iliescu is very familiar with reality, which dictates his decisions.

[Constantinescu] He and Adrian Nastase [Social Democracy Party of Romania-PDSR executive president] know a different reality. They are concerned with organizing the bureaucracy, which supports them and propelled them where they are today. I am concerned with fulfilling people's hopes.

[Lucaciu] A last question about probabilities. The mass media believe it is a certainty that Ion Iliescu will run again for the presidency. However, if he actually thinks of his age and decides not to run—as a consequence of which the PDSR will back Adrian Nastase's candidature—what will your strategy be in that case?

[Constantinescu] Of course, I have considered that possibility too. However, my strategy in such an eventuality will remain secret for the time being.

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Presidency Members Hold Talks With Contact Group

AU2401123795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Talks have been under way in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency building since about noon [1100 GMT] between the delegation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities and the members of the international Contact Group for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation is represented by Presidency members Ejup Ganic, Stjepan Kljujic, Ivo Komsic, Nijaz Durakovic, Mirko Pejanovic, Tatjana Ljujic-Mijatovic, and Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankic.

The Contact Group yesterday visited Pale, where talks were held with the representatives of the [Serbian] aggressor.

Ganic Comments on Plan

AU2401142595 Paris AFP in English 1407 GMT 24 Jan 95

[Report by Nathaniel Harrison]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 24 (AFP)—The five-nation "Contact Group," pressing for a resumption in Bosnia peace talks, ran headlong into Bosnian Government insistence Tuesday [24 January] that the Serbs first accept an international plan for the country.

Ejup Ganic, vice president of Bosnia's Moslem-Croat Federation, also criticized a U.S. decision to reopen contacts with the Serbs even though they have rejected the group proposal.

"Once the...Serbs accept the peace plan of the Contact Group the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be ready to negotiate," Ganic said after a one-hour session with group officials.

Group spokesman Charles Thomas of the United States nonetheless characterized the talks "as an excellent exchange of views" and repeated the group's commitment to the plan unveiled last July.

Thomas and representatives from the four other group members, Britain, France, Germany and Russia, then set off over the mountains for Pale, the capital of the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb republic 15 kilometers (nine miles) east of here.

Thomas has been in Bosnia since Saturday and has already met twice in Pale—on Sunday and Monday—with Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, consistent with a controversial US decision to reopen contacts with Serb authorities.

Such contacts had been avoided since the Serbs last year rejected the contact group proposal to allot them 49 percent of Bosnia- Hercegovina, down from the 70 percent they currently control, and the Moslem-Croat Federation 51 percent.

Ganic on Tuesday ill-concealed his displeasure with the U.S. move. "It would be better if I don't express my opinion. We were surprised ... If we were asked, we'd say it's not a good idea. But since they decided to do it, their decision carries some responsibility." He also suggested that Washington may be trying to win concessions from Karadzic by agreeing to talk to him again.

"Apparently the Karadzic Serbs have promised to accept the peace plan. If that is the case, we'll have to see." But while the Serbs may have won a more sympathetic hearing from the United States, they remain on the defensive at the United Nations. The Security Council on Monday decided to prolong tough sanctions against them on grounds that conditions for easing the restrictions had not yet been met.

While the Bosnian Government agreed to the terms of the peace plan when they were presented last July, the Serbs turned them down, arguing that they would be given disjointed parcels of poor quality territory with no access to the sea.

At talks Saturday between Thomas, Ganic and Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, the government urged the Contact Group to impose a precise deadline for acceptance of the plan and to consider further sanctions against any party that failed to respect the date.

But Karadzic on Monday said in Pale after his second round with Thomas that "some progress" had been achieved toward getting negotiations going again. While rejecting the land division proposed by the West, the Serb leader late last month signalled his willingness to consider the plan as a basis for peace talks.

At roughly the same time, and to the great annoyance of the Bosnian government, group officials began referring to their proposal as a "starting point." The Bosnian Government contends that it had been presented the plan as a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, which it took, and deeply resents what it sees as the recent tilt toward the Serbs by the West, notably the United States.

Ganic, Thomas Comment

AU2401161995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 24 Jan 95

[Report by Mladen Bosnjak on talks between Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency members and Contact Group delegation in Sarajevo on 24 January; Thomas and Ganic statements are in English fading into superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Bosnjak] Charles Thomas, the U.S. representative in the Contact Group, and Ejup Ganic addressed journalists. Their statements were very brief. The U.S. representative in the Contact Group said:

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[Thomas] We had a decisive exchange of opinion with the Presidency members. We reiterated that the Contact Group continues to support its plan. We were acquainted with the mode of implementing the cessation of hostilities agreement and we maintain that this agreement is very important and indispensable to the development of the peace process.

[Bosnjak] Presidency member Ejup Ganic added the following to Mr. Charles Thomas's words:

[Ganic] As Ambassador Thomas himself said, we acquainted the Contact Group members with the problems present in implementing the cessation of hostilities agreement. The blue routes still have not been opened, foreign troops are still on the territory of the Bihac Krajina, and the medical evacuations have not been carried out. When Karadzic's Serbs accept the Contact Group plan, then the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities will be ready for further negotiations.

[Bosnjak] And that was all that was said about today's talks. The journalists' few questions remained without an answer.

Ganic Rejects Further Truce

AU2401200095 Paris AFP in English 1947 GMT 24 Jan 95

[by Nathaniel Harrison]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 24 (AFP)—The Bosnian Government warned Tuesday it would reject a new cessation of hostilities accord with the Serbs if they have not accepted a Western peace plan by April 30, when the current pact is scheduled to expire.

Ejup Ganic, vice president of Bosnia's Moslem-Croat Federation, also said that once the Serbs under Radovan Karadzic agree to a plan prepared by the five-nation "Contact Group," the proposed land division could be adjusted.

He described a recent U.S. decision to undertake direct talks with the Serbs, even though they have so far refused the western plan, as "very dangerous" and said it implicated Washington more deeply in the Bosnian crisis.

"If you renew the cessation of hostilities forever then it means (Karadzic) just has to sit back and say 'I won,'" Ganic argued in an interview here. He characterized April 30 as a "deadline" by which the Serbs must endorse the plan allowing for detailed negotiations to get underway.

But he added: "We feel there will not be another cessation of hostilities." Experts from the Contact Group, representing Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States, have intensified contacts here and in the Serb stronghold in Pale, east of Sarajevo, hoping to take advantage of the four-month truce.

The group met here with Ganic and other Bosnian officials early Tuesday and later travelled to Pale to confer with Karadzic. The government has agreed to the plan, which was unveiled last July and would accord a Moslem-Croat federation 51 percent of the country.

The Serbs, who currently control 70 percent of Bosnia, turned down the proposed land division, insisting that the 49 percent they would receive is unproductive territory offering them no access to the sea. Ganic repeated the government's demand that the Serbs agree to the percentages specified in the proposal before negotiations can resume.

"If he (Karadzic) accepts the plan, we can put the map on the wall and he can make proposals," Ganic explained.

"If he wants to take a piece from somewhere, then he has to say where he'll give compensation for it. We told the contact group we want him to accept the plan and then we can look at the map and make some possible adjustments."

Ganic made clear his anxiety over a decision last week by the United States to reopen contacts with the Bosnian Serbs in spite of their failure to date to adhere to the Contact Group scheme.

The U.S. expert on the team, Charles Thomas, went alone to Pale on Sunday to meet Karadzic and saw him again on Monday, consistent with the new U.S. policy. "I think it is very dangerous... but now they've (the United States) taken the responsibility. I think to some extent it is a mistake because it looks like they're giving in to Serbian demands.

"But they are taking the responsibility for breaking the isolation of the Karadzic Serbs... and are now more responsible for the outcome than before."

Karadzic-Contact Group Talk

LD2401210695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2034 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 24 Jan (TANJUG)—Talks on the resumption of the peace process in former Bosnia-Herzegovina between [Bosnian] Serb republic president Dr. Radovan Karadzic and members of the Contact Group, ended in Pale this evening. According to SRNA, the talks were assessed as "very constructive."

After the meeting Karadzic said that "the talks were serious," stressing that further efforts are needed "to find a good solution." The Serb republic president described today's talks as "a bridge that can lead to the resumption of the peace process in former Bosnia-Herzegovina."

According to SRNA, U.S. ambassador Charles Thomas confirmed that "the talks were comprehensive" and that "work will continue on a new project to resume peace negotiations."

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Ganic, EU Official Talk Peace Plan Resumption

AU2401165795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Ejup Ganic, member of the Bosnia- Herzegovina Presidency and vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, today received Ambassador (Albert Ciro), head of the EU Monitoring Mission.

The topic discussed was the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the chances of resuming the peace process. Dr. Ganic stressed that, for the time being, there are no concrete signs that imply that the aggressor wants to accept the peace plan. The aggressor is attempting to delude certain members of the Contact Group with half-truths and by stalling, Ganic stressed.

Vice President Ganic Appeals to Newt Gingrich

LD2401233895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Ejup Ganic, member of the Presidency and vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has sent a letter to Congressman Newt Gingrich, one of the leading American politicians, describing the latest situation and developments in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ganic says in his letter, among other things:

The aggressor has still not carried out the majority of the obligations from the latest agreement on the cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities. Its conduct, the persistent setting of conditions and terms, and the creation of new problems are designed deliberately to stall the peace process. The strangulation of Sarajevo continues.

In reference to the Contact Group, Ganic says: I would like to remind you that the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities fully accepted the Contact Group's plan. Although the plan was a take-it-or-leave-it document, the aggressor rejected it but has suffered no consequences for refusing to cooperate and for its arrogance [drskost]. The aggressor wants the international community to legitimize the principle that might is right, of territorial conquest, crime on a large scale, and genocide. If this is allowed to happen, it will signify the decline [sumrak] of Western democracy.

This is what Ganic had to say about the Federation:

On the basis of the Washington Agreement, signed in the presence of President Clinton, the Federation of Bosniak Muslims and Croats was set up leaving the possibility for the large majority of the Serbs who do not support Karadzic's fascist policy to join it. Many problems have been encountered in the efforts to implement the Federation. I firmly believe that all the problems surrounding the development of the Federation can be resolved swiftly and successfully providing the provisions of the Washington Agreement are strictly observed. This is all that the Bosniak side is insisting on.

It is in the American tradition to help small nations that are fighting for their freedom and democracy. We in Bosnia-Herzegovina expect this positive side of American foreign policy to be affirmed in the best possible way, i.e., by lifting the arms embargo and urgently delivering arms to the legitimate authorities of a UN member country, the victim of aggression.

In conclusion, Dr. Ganic invited Congressman Gingrich to visit Sarajevo.

No Results in Muslim-Croat Talks on Refugees

LD2401220195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2155 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 24 (TANJUG)—The latest session of the Muslim-Croat Commission for the repatriation of refugees to central Bosnia has yielded no results, Bosnian Croat Radio said Tuesday.

Bosnian Muslims and Croats fought a bitter war for territories with mixed populations in central Bosnia until March 1994. The Commission held its 25th unsuccessful session in the central Bosnian town of Gornji Vakuf on Monday under the wing of the U.N. Protection Force to discuss the implementation of a pilot program for repatriating refugees to central Bosnia.

The commission was set up after the signing of the Federation Agreement under U.S. pressure in Washington in March, 1994.

Bosnian Croat Radio Herceg-Bosna blamed the failure of the latest session on the Muslim demand for involving the competent ministry of the Muslim-Croat Federation in the implementation of the program. The Croats insist, however, that the Gornji Vakuf-based Civic Executive Committee has been empowered to implement the program under an accord signed by the two sides in November, 1994.

Radio Herceg-Bosna also said that Muslim military and civilian police were on Tuesday still blockading the central Bosnian town of Vares and harassing local Croats. Three days ago, Muslim police arrested two Croat women in Vares on charges of arms trafficking. the source said. The radio said the two women had been on the way to visit their war-devastated homes, which they had been forced to flee, together with 8,000 other Croats, in October 1993.

After a day of interrogation and maltreatment in Muslim prison, the women were released, but warned by Muslim police never to return to Vares, said Radio Herceg-Bosna.

Commentary on U.S. View of Bosnia Crisis

LD2401120395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1135 GMT 24 Jan 95

["Pool" item; by Vjekoslav Radovic]

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, Jan 24 (TANJUG)—U.S. political top, as well as the more sensible commentators, have after long fumbling in the dark come to understand there could be no mediation in the Bosnia conflict by acknowledging the stands of only one side—Muslim.

The change was heralded by U.S. State Secretary Warren Christopher in a letter to Bosnian Muslim leader Alija izetbegovic on Thursday. Christopher informed Izetbegovic in the letter that the U.S. Government has decided, despite the U.N. Security Council resolution banning all contacts with the Bosnian Serbs, to negotiate with them directly.

A serious diplomatic incident was linked to the letter the proportions and consequences of which it was not yet possible clearly to grasp: Alija Izetbegovic showed the letter from the U.S. state secretary to reporters in Sarajevo.

According to U.S. reporters in Sarajevo, Christopher's letter caused a true shock in Sarajevo, although the 'Contact Group' previousy stayed in Pale and did what Christopher had merely indicated.

The shock was no smaller at the White House, which thus far omitted to voice its view on the matter, but surely did not expect its Muslim proteges would be trying to denounce and compromise it as vacillating and mild toward the Serbs.

This happened one week prior to the departure of Gen. Michael Rose as U.N. commander in Bosnia, whom Bosnian Muslims even omitted to say 'goodbye' to and prior to the arrival of Muslim Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic in Washington for new consultations.

During that same week, former U.S. state secretary James Baker appeared in the Congressional Foreign Relations Committee. Baker said the guilt for the civil war in the former Yugoslavia lay primarily with the breakaway republics of Slovenia and Croatia.

In the letter to Izetbegovic, according to THE NEW YORK TIMES, Christopher pointed out that the cease-fire accord signed Jan. 1 offered an opportunity to renew negotiations which should not be let to slip by and that the U.S. was prepared to examine every possibility for peace.

Similar pressure was exerted on the Muslim authorities also by U.S. Assistant State Secretary Richard Holbrooke during his visit to Sarajevo on Jan. 9. He warned at the time the Muslims not to count much on belligerent statements of Republican Senator Bob Dole, who saw everything through the prism of his own political career.

The Clinton administration was the last, best friend of the Bosnian Government, Holbrooke said.

THE NEW YORK TIMES commented that the Clinton administration was right to pursue direct negotiations with Bosnian Serbs, despite the Bosnian Government's objections and the U.N. ban.

It went on to say that a cessation of hostilities in Bosnia came about only when Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter hinted that the map as proposed by the Contact Group was not above modification. These changes could not be carried out if the map authors, including the U.S., did not negotiate directly with the Serbs.

In Washington, no doubt, there had been a change, if not in the stand itself, then toward a more flexible approach to the Bosnian crisis. It remains to be seen to what degree the U.S. would be in a position to influence Silajdzic during his visit and to what measure the Bosnian Serbs' flexibility would assist it.

The U.S., which has thus far undermined all peace efforts of the international community by keeping up the false hopes of Bosnian Muslims about an outside military intervention, could make up for it now and point out to Silajdzic the 'cruel reality'—that the West would not wage the holy war, Jihad, for him.

Rose: Gorazde Housing Used as Muslim 'Ploys'

LD2401115495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1140 GMT 24 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 24 (TANJUG)—Outgoing U.N. commander for Bosnia, Gen. Michael Rose, whose one-year term ends on Tuesday, has said that Bosnian Muslims are resorting to ploys in the propaganda war.

The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA quoted Rose as saying on BBC late Monday that Bosnian Muslims had for instance claimed that houses which had been blown up in the Muslim-held town of Gorazde in eastern Bosnia had allegedly been shelled by Bosnian Serbs.

Gen. Rose, who was in Gorazde at the time of the fiercest fighting around the town in the Spring of 1994, said many destroyed houses were to be seen in the area so that the impression was that the town had been heavily damaged in shelling from surrounding hills. He said, however, that the destroyed houses had roofs but no windows or doors.

SRNA quoted Rose as saying Serbs had lived in many of those houses before the outbreak of the civil war but were driven out by Muslim troops at the very beginning. Rose said 12,000 Serbs had lived in the Gorazde area before the outbreak of the civil war and destroyed houses were evidence of the ethnic cleansing carried out by Muslims.

Serbs Approve Passage for UNHCR Aid Convoy

LD2401145795 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1416 GMT 24 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zvornik, Jan. 24 (TANJUG)—A UNHCR convoy with relief aid for the Muslim town of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia on Tuesday safely went across Bosnian Serb territory, Serb military sources said.

The sources said the ten-truck convoy carrying more than 70 tonnes of food and 5.5 tonnes of heating oil proceeded for Srebrenica after a routine check in the Bosnian Serb town of Zvornik, on the border with Yugoslavia.

The sources said the Serb side had approved passage across its territory to the UNHCR convoys which are on Wednesday to deliver humanitarian aid to the Muslim-held part of Sarajevo, Srebrenica and the Muslim-held town of Zepa in eastern Bosnia.

Medical Evacuations To Be Suspended in Feb

AU2401153295 Paris AFP in English 1425 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 24 (AFP)—The evacuation of patients, notably children, from Bosnia-Herzegovina will be suspended come end of February because of lack of funds and foreign hospitals willing to take them, a UN official warned here Tuesday [24 January].

Fausto Mariani, coordinator for the International Organisation for Migration, said very few countries were now accepting patients, with most going to Italy and Denmark. On Wednesday, some 30 children were to be evacuated from Zenica, in central Bosnia, and 35 more from Sarajevo on Thursday.

"If nothing changes, these will be the last evacuations," Mariani told AFP.

In The Hague, the Dutch defence ministry Tuesday said a Hercules C-130 transport plane would fly to Ancona, Italy, Thursday to evacuate 26 war wounded from the former Yugoslavia. Nineteen would be taken to Denmark, three to the Netherlands, three to the Czech Republic and one to Germany. The flight was organised by the International Organisation for Migration.

Medical evacuations, which began in October 1993, have seen 2,500 people flown to 33 countries, mostly in Europe and the United States.

UN Plans To Reopen Tuzla Airport for Aid

AU2501100995 Paris AFP in English 0914 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Jan 25 (AFP)—The United Nations plans to reopen the Tuzla Airport in northeast Bosnia by February 1 in compliance with a Bosnian Government demand, a UN official reported here Wednesday [25 January].

He said the base would be used for flights carrying humanitarian goods and supplies for an estimated 5,700 UN Protection Force peacekeepers deployed there.

The Bosnian Government on January 17 delivered an ultimatum to UN authorities here, warning that they would have to open the airport by February 1 or leave the facility altogether by March 1. UN officials said they had wanted the base open but had not reached an agreement with rebel Serbs, whose forces in the area overlook the airport from nearby heights.

It was not immediately clear if the UN authorities had worked out an understanding with the Serbs. [passage omitted]

Ganic Calls on New UN Commander To 'Upgrade'

AU2401210295 Paris AFP in English 2028 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 24 (AFP)—A senior Bosnian official on Tuesday said his government wanted General Rupert Smith, the new UN commander for the country, to call in NATO airstrikes to enforce UN resolutions.

Ejup Ganic, vice president in Bosnia's Moslem-Croat Federation, was at the same time bitterly critical of Smith's predecessor, General Michael Rose, accusing him of having humiliated NATO during his just-ended one year tenure here. Rose handed over responsibility to Smith, also from Britain, in the Croatian capital Zagreb early on Tuesday. Smith is due in Sarajevo on Wednesday.

Speaking of the new commander, Ganic said in an interview: "I want him to upgrade all the existing resolutions, to upgrade NATO performance here. I want him to use his freedom of movement...to deliver humanitarian aid, to monitor human rights and to be present on all the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"He has that right (freedom of movement). He should not adopt a technique to negotiate about his rights with every jerk on the street. Whenever there is a violation, he can call in NATO and use it as a respectable force, not as a joke."

Ganic charged that Rose had been reluctant to use NATO airpower against the Serbs, and, when he did so, he made the Alliance "look ridiculous" by limiting its fighting capacity.

When the Serbs destroyed a tank operated by the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), Ganic alleged, Rose in effect informed Serb officers when and where NATO aircraft were to retaliate.

"So the Serbs could say 'it's one for one.' They got the feeling they were fighting NATO."

What Rose should have done, according to Ganic, was to have hit "10 Serbian tanks full of soldiers so they'd never dare to do it again." Rose left here Monday with no public accolades from the Bosnian Government, which considered him entirely too lenient with Serbs.

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In his final days in Sarajevo, he vigorously defended his record, arguing that it would have been disastrous to the UN peacekeeping mission to have used NATO airpower for strategic reasons or to enforce a political position. Rose likewise denied having communicated with the Serbs about NATO strike plans.

Reports of Serb Rifle Fire on Sarajevo Suburbs

AU2401190095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, the enemy in Sarajevo violated the cease-fire agreement on several occasions. Aggressor's activity was reported in the suburbs this morning, while after 1200 [1100 GMT], the aggressor opened fire from automatic rifles and snipers at the region of Marijin Dvor from his positions in Sljivik and the Jewish Cemetery. There were no casualties, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army members did not respond to the provocations. Citizens are warned to exercise caution when moving across open spaces in the city, the 1st Corps Information Service reports.

Serbs Use Antiaircraft Guns on Herzegovina Front

AU2401152995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sporadic small arms provocations on our defense lines were reported on the Bijelimic-Zupa and Konjic part of the front in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 4th Corps theater of operations. In the southernmost part of the 4th Corps theater of operations, the chetniks fired from antiaircraft guns at the wider area of Osjak, Obradovici, and (?Igrici) on several occasions. The 4th Corps members did not respond to the aggressor's provocations, but they are ready to thwart any surprises.

Brcko Truce Violated; Serbs Flying Helicopters

AU2501093895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 25 Jan 95

[Report by Hamiz Deronjic and Nihad Salihovic from Brcko]

[FBIS Translated Text] There was no peace on the Brcko front last night. After intensive sniper activity all day yesterday, last night, at about 2000, the aggressor tried to infiltrate a large subversive-terrorist group in the area around Donja Brka. The alertness of our fighters once again come to the fore and the chetniks were quickly (?prevented) from carrying out their intentions.

Overnight, the aggressor fired 60-mm mortars on [words indistinct] The chetniks also made intensive use of light arms over the (?entire) front. In addition to stepping up attacks on of the 108th motorized brigade positions, the aggressor was also regrouping its forces. This morning, at about (?0350), military trucks were seen arriving [words indistinct]. Moreover, three aggressor helicopters were seen arriving this morning from the direction of Bijeljina in the temporarily occupied area around Brcko.

Report of Serbs Continuing Offensive in Bihac

AU2401151795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 24 Jan 95

[Report by Muhamed Mulic]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Words indistinct] cannot be reported from the western part of the Bosnian Krajina because the joint aggressors are relentlessly continuing their offensive operations on almost all fronts. In addition to small arms provocations, the joint aggressors around the Bihac protected area used 82-mm and 120-mm mortars, and 40-mm self-propelled antiaircraft Praga guns to fire at the villages of Vitici, Mala Pec, [name indistinct], and Izacic, but also at the defense lines of the 5th Corps and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] for Bihac. [Words indistinct] in the morning also attempted an infantry attack at Bugar, but his intentions were thwarted and he was pushed back to initial positions.

Martic's chetniks and Fikret Abdic's paramilitaries continued their joint attacks in the area around Velika Kladusa, particularly between [name indistinct] and Sumarica. The wider area of Buzim is also under howitzer, tank, and mortar attacks from the so-called Serbian Krajina from the direction of Terbula and Latinovac. It is worth noting that the 5th Corps and HVO defense is stable and that the lines have not been moved. Aggressor provocations were also reported in the area of Bosanska Krupa and Bosanska Otoka, and on the Grmusa-Srbljani plateau and the Grabez Heights. Snipers, 60-mm and 82-mm mortars, and small arms were used on these fronts.

Muslims, Croats Fire on Serbs

LD2401191995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1805 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Petrovac, Jan. 24 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Muslim forces and regular army troops of neighboring Croatia on Tuesday opened fire in Bosnia, despite a cease-fire that has been agreed by Bosnia's warring sides.

Bosnian Serb Army sources said two Serb soldiers had been wounded in Muslim attacks on Serb positions around Bihac and Krupa in northwestern Bosnia. Two Muslim terrorist groups on Tuesday failed to infiltrate behind Bosnian Serb lines at the foot of Mt. Pljesevica near Bihac, the sources said.

Muslim forces also opened fire on Bosnian Serb positions around Konjic and Mt. Treskavica in the region of Herzegovina, as well as on Serb positions west of Doboj in northern Bosnia, the sources said.

The Army of neighboring Croatia, which has committed an act of aggression in Bosnia, on Tuesday opened fire

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on Bosnian Serb villages west of the Herzegovina town of Trebinje, the Bosnian Serb sources said.

Heavy inter-Muslim fighting on Tuesday continued in the area around Velika Kladusa, the center of the Muslim autonomous province of west Bosnia, local Velkaton Radio reported.

United Nations Protection Force Spokesman Graham Dale confirmed that the two Muslim sides were engaged in heavy fighting. West Bosnian Muslim sources reported casualties on both sides.

Inter-Muslim fighting in the Bihac region renewed last October. The two sides had for the first time clashed in the fall of 1993, when local Muslim businessman Fikret Abdic proclaimed the region's autonomy on the basis of a local referendum. Abdic, who had been a member of the earlier Bosnian presidency, is opposed to the policy of war pursued by Muslim leader in Sarajevo Alija Izetbegovic and advocates peaceful life side by side with Serbs and Croats.

War in Bihac Continues

AU2501114495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 25 Jan 95

[Report by Muhamed Mulic]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Velika Kladusa area is again today experiencing the fiercest enemy attacks on the defense lines of the fighters of the 5th Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The joint aggressors together with Fikret Abdic's formations are fiercely attacking the Vrnograc area, firing with artillery and tanks and using infantry units. The fighters of the 5th Corps successfully responded to these attacks despite the fact that the lines of defense are subjected to constant shelling from the so-called Serbian Krajina. The attempts by the aggressor forces to penetrate deep into the free territory of the Bihac region have remained in vain.

The open enemy attacks on the defense lines of the 5th Corps and the Croatian Defense Council continued in the Bihac region, especially on the villages of (?Jasiba), Izacic, (?Savnik), Mala Pec, [word indistinct], and Gata. These attacks are being launched from the well-known aggressor's strongholds in Zeljava and Licko Petrovo Selo. Machine-gun and sniper provocations and sporadic firing from 60-mm and 82-mm mortars were registered in the Zegar, Klokot, and Vedro Polje area. On other fronts, especially on the Bosanska Krupa front and the Grmusa-Srbljani and Grabez plateaus, the enemy is continuing provocative fire from snipers and anti-aircraft machine guns.

Let us say at the end that the war in this part of our republic is continuing with full ferocity, together with all the accompanying misfortunes, as the aggressor is not observing the agreements that it has signed on the cease-fire and the end of hostilities. Martic's chetniks are still present in one part of the Bihac region despite the agreement on their withdrawal to the UNPA [UN Protected Areas] in the so-called Serbian Krajina.

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Tudjman, Izetbegovic, Zubak Begin Talks in Zagreb

LD2401123895 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Talks began at 1230 hours [1130 GMT] in the Presidential Palace in Zagreb between Croatian President Franjo Tudjman; Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation; and Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The talks are taking place behind closed doors but it is presumed that numerous topics of mutual interest will be uppermost. It is worth recalling here that in Bosnia-Herzegovina there are still no generally acceptable solutions, in view of the fact that the Serb side does not accept the Contact Group plan to which Croatia and the Bosniak side have already given their consent.

Apart from this, today's collocutors have very great interest in considering current possible problems—from personnel problems to organizational problems to problems of competences in the framework of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

There is no doubt that the Bosnian collocutors will be interested in Croatia's standpoints on the further steps toward peace in the wake of Croatia's cancellation of UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Force] current mandate. Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have a very long border especially in the currently occupied areas. It is sufficient here to recall the attacks by Serb rebels from this area on the Bihac pocket.

After today's talks between Tudjman, Zubak, and Izetbegovic, joint or individual statements are expected.

Izetbegovic, Zubak Comment

LD2401145195 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 24 Jan 95

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman; Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency; and Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation met in Zagreb early this afternoon. After a one-hour meeting they announced that they would be issuing a joint statement later, while Izetbegovic and Zubak gave short statements to the press. Andjelko Perincic reporting.

[Perincic] Describing the talks as constructive and useful, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, briefly spoke about the subjects under discussion.

[Izetbegovic] "We discussed the Federation, the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I informed President Tudjman about the talks under way on the implementation of the cessation of hostilities and about the Contact Group's activities on reviving the negotiations.

"President Tudjman informed me about various aspects of the problems resulting from the cancellation of UNPROFOR's [UN Protection force] mandate; we also talked about relations between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. I insisted that the 14 agreements waiting since this summer be finally signed, the agreements pertaining to our mutual relations. We concluded that difficulties existed in the implementation of the federal constitution. Mr. Zubak and Mr. Ganic will be forming a team charged with the task of directly tackling these difficulties; the difficulties are really great, nobody is trying to conceal this fact."

[Perincic] Commenting on the problems that exist, Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, stated:

[Zubak] "Despite all these problems, the relations between our two peoples have not been dislocated. Ultimately it can be seen that there are no conflicts, no armed incidents, and this is the best proof that, despite the differences that exist, relations have not been ruptured. There continues to be a readiness and a will to see that the Federation is developed in accordance with agreements; today both sides confirmed their unreserved support for the Federation's Constitution, and ultimately this is the only solution in the current, international, and internal situaton of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This would be the only solution in the interest of both peoples."

Statement on Talks

LD2401191495 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In the course of regular consultations, as envisaged by an agreement on friendship and cooperation between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman today met Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, and Kresimir Zubak, Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation president. This is the statement:

The meeting was also attended by Hrvoje Sarinic, head of the president's office; Mate Granic, deputy prime minister of Croatia and minister for foreign affairs; Bosiljko Misetic, the president's special commissioner for confederal relations between Croatia and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation; and Kasim Trnka, ambassador of Bosnia-Herzegovina .

Presidents Izetbegovic and Zubak reported on the implementation of the agreement on hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and their talks with the Contact Group for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The representatives of the Republic and Federation stressed their firm commitment to a peaceful solution to the crisis. The most important issues in the further peace process as well as

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cooperation with the Contact Group in the course of implementing its peace plan were also discussed.

Also reviewed were several specific issues relating to the implementation of the Washington Agreements in the establishment of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and its confederation with Croatia. Special emphasis was laid on the need to sign a number of agreements between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both sides stressed their firm determination and political willingness to implement the Washington agreements.

It was proposed that the president and vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation form a special group for examining open questions related to the implementation of the Federal Constitution and proposing concrete solutions. In the event of uncoordinated stands on certain issues, the two sides will request the good offices of the U.S., German, Austrian, and Turkish ambassadors to Bosnia-Herzzegovina. It was concluded that the differences were not unsurmountable and that the Croat and Bosniak leaderships would be working in favor of the speedy implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

Granic Explains Ending UNPROFOR Mandate

LD2401154495 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 24 Jan 95

[Excerpt of speech by Foreign Minister Mate Granic to parliament's Chamber of Counties on the ending of the UN Protection Force's mandate in Croatia on 31 March 1995; date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] When deciding to end the peacekeeping forces' mandate, Croatia's basic intention and aim was to put a stop to this process of the de facto freezing of a completely unacceptable situation—a situation that is unacceptable both to Croats as the majority people and to the Serb ethnic community in Croatia. The aim was to give the negotiating and peace processes a fresh impetus and content and begin to bring them to an end within a clearly defined timescale in precisely the way envisaged in the peace plan and resolutions of the UN Security Council—within the borders of a sovereign, united Republic of Croatia.

The best solutions are possible on the basis of appropriate forms of cultural autonomy and territorial self-government in already precisely defined areas and in keeping with our constitution and constitutional law and accompanied by respect for the highest European standards of human rights and the rights of ethnic communities and appropriate forms of international supervision. [passage omitted]

Granic: 'Not Negotiable'

LD2401214695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2129 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Jan. 24 (TANJUG)—Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic said Tuesday that the government in Zagreb was determined to terminate the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force [UNPROFOR]. He said the decision was not negotiable despite pressure to the contrary.

Reporting to the Croatian parliament's upper house on the reasons behind the decision, Granic said UNPROFOR had failed to produce a political settlement and place Serb Krajina under Zagreb's control. The republic of Serb Krajina was set up by Serbs in Croatia in 1991, after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian constitution. Serb Krajina was placed under U.N. protection in the spring of 1992, but has since been the target of four new Croatian military offensives.

The announcement by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman on Jan. 12 that Zagreb would deny further hospitality to U.N. peacekeepers at the expiry of their mandate on March 31 has been taken by Serb Krajina to mean that Croatia might attack again. A plan devised by U.N. Special Envoy Cyrus Vance in Late 1991 and early 1992 envisaged for deploying U.N. peacekeepers as a buffer between the warring sides pending a negotiated political solution.

Granic said that even if a political solution were found through talks by March 31, there was still no need for such a massive international presence, particularly not military presence, to implement economic and political agreements. Their implementation should be placed in the hands of civilian monitors, which is a role for which international organizations and institutions other than UNPROFOR are better suited, said Granic.

According to UNPROFOR figures, there were more than 15,000 U.N. peacekeepers in the U.N.-protected areas in Serb Krajina and Croatia in late December, 1994.

Granic said that Zagreb wanted to intensify talks with the Krajina Serbs on local autonomy but only within the Croatian state. The republic of Serb Krajina is refusing all talk on integration into Croatia, insisting that it is a legitimate state, formed at the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia.

Council Backs Decision

LD2501105595 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1023 GMT 25 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Jan. 25 (TANJUG)—Croatia's Defense and National Security Council has again backed President Franjo Tudjman's decision to deny hospitality to the U.N. peacekeepers [UN Protection Force, UNPROFOR] whose current six- month mandate expires on March 31.

The council met late Tuesday because of the concern voiced by the European Union and the United States and their calls for Croatia to reconsider its decision.

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It was the second time in seven days that Croatia's Defense and National Security Council confirmed the decision taken by Tudjman on Jan. 12.

The U.N. peacekeepers were deployed in Croatia and the republic of Serb Krajina in the spring of 1992 with a mandate to separate the two warring sides until a political solution is found. Serbs in Croatia proclaimed their own state, the republic of Serb Krajina, in 1991, after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslav Federation and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian Constitution.

Authorities Will Not Change

LD2401135095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1331 GMT 24 Jan 95

["Pool" item; by Nikola Stanojevic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Jan 24 (TANJUG)—Croatian authorities reject the very idea of changing their decision to deny further hospitality to U.N. Protection Force [UNPROFOR] troops.

Even Croatia's friends, the United States and Germany, have in vain been trying to persuade Zagreb that the departure of the U.N. peacekepers would threaten to trigger a new a war on the territory of what used to be the Republic Croatia in the former Yugoslav Federation.

Croatia is also turning a deaf ear to warnings from abroad that the withdrawal of the U.N. peacekeepers would return the process to the starting point and destroy everything that has been achieved in negotiations between the republic of Serb Krajina and Croatia.

Serbs in Croatia created their own state, the republic of Serb Krajina, in 1991, after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian Constitution. The territory of the republic of Serb Krajina has been under U.N. protection since March 1992. The current six-month mandate of the U.N. peacekeepers expires on March 31.

Croatian President Tudjman announced on Jan. 12 that Zagreb had decided to deny hospitality to the U.N. Protection Force as of March 31. The key question is where has Zagreb found such strong backing and on the basis of what to be able repeatedly to insist that the departure of the U.N. peacekeepers will not lead to a new war but to a general peace.

A leading official of the ruling Croatian Democratic Union Ivan Milas has revealed, possibly unintentionally, what is behind Croatia's decision. Milas has said that the presence of the U.N. Protection Force has doubtlessly given Croatia 'breathing space and time to get ready.' Croatia's decision is based on the assessments that the Krajina Serbs cannot defend the 1,200 km of the line separating the two sides. Croatian politicians and media do not hesitate to say that 'an easy and fast victory will be won.' Independent sources, however, present different figures and assessments. UNPROFOR military experts say that republic of Serb Krajina armed forces are excellently prepared and their morale is high.

Although the territory of the republic of Serb Krajina has been under U.N. protection since March 1992, it has been the target of four Croatian military offensives since. In the operations, characterized by brutality towards Krajina Serbs, Croatian troops failed to occupy any significant territories.

Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak has publicly conceded that Zagreb had sent to international organizations false reports about its military potentials. Susak has said on television that Croatia has ground-to-ground missile systems and other 'unregistered' weapons. He added with a smile on his face that he was unable to go into details because the country was 'under embargo.'

The U.N. Security Council in September 1991 imposed an embargo on arms deliveries to the former Yugoslavia, but the embargo has heavily been violated by Croatia, Slovenia and the Sarajevo-based Bosnian Muslim Government.

Tudjman said late last year that Croatia had 114,000 troops, but Croatia's report to the OSCE (formerly CSCE) said it had only 63,000 armed troops.

When it decided to deny further hospitality to the U.N. peacekepers, Croatian authorities proceded also from the evaluation that 'Russia is busy with Chechnya' and will not be able 'actively to participate' in the developments in the former Yugoslavia.

Another element was the majority won by Republicans in both chambers of the U.S. Congress, where Senator Bob Dole is just one of Croatia's Republican friends.

Poll Shows Krajina Serbs Oppose Reintegration

AU2401154695 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Jan 95 p 9

[Article by Z. Landeka Aleksic: "Knin Does Not Trust Zagreb"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] According to an opinion poll, whose results were published in the first issue of KRAJINA independent magazine, the Serbs do not trust Tudjman. The inhabitants of Krajina view negotiations with Croatia with a certain amount of suspicion considering that the Croats had not stopped "gunning for them" even at the peak of the most intensive negotiations.

They view the future of their young republic with optimism though. According to the results of the poll, the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] can either be integrated with other Serb states, or become completely independent, that is, can never be a part of the Republic of Croatia again. [passage omitted]

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The question "what do you attach priority to in the negotiations with Zagreb," produced the most diverse answers. Ten percent of the Krajina inhabitants gave priority to the opening of roads, 28.5 percent hold the view that establishing economic relations with Zagreb would solve the problem of their foreign currency savings, and 61.5 percent of them take the view that establishing economic relations would results in improvements in the payments system, salaries, and pensions.

Fear of Armed Attacks

The inhabitants of Krajina demonstrated the highest degree of unanimity in their answers to the question on the future of the young republic. In response to the KRAJINA's question as to where do they saw the RSK after the completion of the peace process, 98.2 percent of the respondents said that they exclusively saw the future of their state in integration with other Serb states. The only possible alternative to this is an independent RSK.

Only 0.2 percent of the Krajina inhabitants envisage the RSK integrated in Croatia. [passage omitted]

[Box, p 9]

Respondents

The opinion poll was conducted according to the random sampling method and involved 500 respondents. The magazine's research team obtained answers via telephone from the communes of Beli Manastir, Vukovar, Okucani, Petrinja, Obrovac, Knin, Drnis, Korenica, and Glina.

Country Seeks Serb Krajina, Recognition

LD2401151495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1430 GMT 24 Jan 95

["Pool" item; by Stevan Cordas]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 24 (TANJUG)—Croatian official Zvonimir Markovic said Monday that Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic might visit Belgrade soon, but 'forgot' to mention Croatia 'owed' Yugoslavia two visits.

Granic, who is also Croatian deputy prime minister, failed to return a visit to Zeljko Simic, who has been in Zagreb in the capacity of Yugoslav deputy prime minister. Granic broke his promise to visit Belgrade also after Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic visited Zagreb.

In the first case, Croatia had made Granic's visit conditional on the reopening of the Belgrade-Zagreb Highway. The highway was reopened in December 1994, but Croatia has set another condition—mutual recognition between Croatia and Yugoslavia.

Unofficial reports say that, despite indications that Granic might visit Belgrade, Croatia has so far failed to officially inform Yugoslavia about its intentions, which, according to Croatians, would serve peace and normalization of relations. These reports indicate that Croatia is only sending out feelers.

Croatia's intention is transparent - to kill two birds with one stone—to 'peacefully reintegrate U.N.-protected areas' into Croatia and to secure recognition from Yugoslavia.

Croatia's view is that Yugoslavia should annul the plan by international mediator Cyrus Vance that Croatia also accepted in January 1992. Under the Vance plan, all key decisions including recognition, cannot be made until Serb Krajina and Croatia completed talks on the normalization of bilateral relations.

Serbs in Croatia set up their own state, the republic of Serb Krajina, in 1991, after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian Constitution. The territory of Serb Krajina was placed under U.N. protection in the spring of 1992.

Yugoslavia favors normalization of relations with Croatia. Its starting point is pragmatical suggesting a 'step by step' normalization aimed at resolving issues that could objectively be solved. Croatia wants everything and it wants it now. It wants both Serb Krajina and recognition.

Unlike Serb Krajina, Croatia persists on war and its feelers sent to Yugoslavia were designed to create an impression that Croatia favors peace. The two, however, are incompatible.

Granic 'Ready To Go to Belgrade' for Talks

AU2501123295 Berlin DIE TAGESZEITUNG in German 23 Jan 95 p 13

[Interview with Foreign Minister Mate Granic by Erich Rathfelder; place and date not given: "I Am Ready To Hold Negotiations With Belgrade"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Rathfelder] On 12 January, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman called for the withdrawal of the UN forces from Croatia and thus the Serbian-occupied territories in Croatia. Many politicians in Europe are worrying that a new war could break out in Croatia.

[Granic] To arrive at a judgment on this issue, one should first define what is at stake in this war. A total of 23 percent of Croatian territory is still occupied. It is true that the local Serbian guerrillas have not reached their original goal of occupying almost all of Croatia. However, they succeeded in expelling most of the Croat population in the occupied territories—218,000 people. Of the formerly 600,000 inhabitants, no more than 200,000 are left.

Our government has left no doubt about the fact that we are seeking a peaceful solution. We have accepted all UN

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demands. In fact, the United Nations at first made sure that the weapons in the so-called UN Protected Areas [UNPA] were silent. Subsequently, however, no additional major progress has been made. Despite the presence of UN troops, the occupied territories virtually were integrated into the Serbian economic system.

So what we really want to achieve with our demand for the withdrawal of the UN troops is to start the negotiation process again. We want negotiations with the international community, with Belgrade, and with the local Serbs. We know that the reintegration of the Serbian-occupied territories into Croatia will also be quite attractive for the Serbian people living there. Since the opening of the highway in Slavonia, more and more Serbs from the UNPA can see for themselves that they have nothing to fear in our territory. There have been no incidents so far. On 27 January, we will meet with a local Serbian delegation and will discuss with them the opening of the pipeline (from the coast to Slavonia—editorial board) and the resumption of railway traffic (from Zagreb via Knin to Dalmatia—editorial board).

[Rathfelder] At the end of November, you concluded an agreement with representatives of the Serb authorities from the occupied territories. At that time, the parties involved were ready to negotiate. Now it is all the more surprising that Tudjman has demanded the UN withdrawal and has thus increased tensions.

[Granic] The UN troops are not enjoying a high reputation in the Croatian public.

[Rathfelder] The United Nations is bound by its mandate. Are you demanding a change in the mandate of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR]?

[Granic] We have had many bad experiences in this respect. We have called upon the Security Council every six months to change the mandate. Nothing happened. But Croatia is of course ready to talk with the international community and implement a possible negotiated result. For the moment, however, we consider it necessary to terminate the UNPROFOR mandate at the proper time. By the way, initial reactions from Belgrade were not so bad.

[Rathfelder] However, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic convened his security council.

[Granic] We do not want a large war between Croatia and Serbia, nor does the Serbian side want such a war. But Serbia only wants to talk about the problems in Croatia when the Bosnian problem is solved. We cannot wait and see what will happen, because it may take a long time. We suggest that Serbia and Croatia mutually recognize each other and solve their problems by way of negotiations.

[Rathfelder] Are there any indications that an agreement on the basis of relations between Croatia and Serbia could be concluded?

[Granic] If he [Milosevic] organizes a meeting in Belgrade at which mutual recognition would be discussed I would be ready to go to Belgrade.

[Rathfelder] Would you also be ready to do so before Serbia eventually recognized Croatia?

[Granic] Yes. Our most important concern is the normalization of relations between the two states.

[Rathfelder] What would a new agreement between the Serbs and Croats mean regarding the division of Bosnia? Tensions between Bosnian Croats and Muslims are increasing again.

[Granic] Croatia has a clear policy. We want to implement a Bosniak-Croat federation in Bosnia, we want to see the plan of the Contact Group implemented. We are not talking about a division of Bosnia. It is the Federation, not the Croatian Government, which has to negotiate with the Bosnian Serbs.

However, we do not agree to the speed with which the Bosniak-Croat Federation is developing. I think for the Bosnian Croats and the Muslims a federation is the only realistic option. The Croats' existence in central Bosnia depends on it. For the Muslims, too, a federation is a chance. Neither a European country nor the United States would accept an Islamic state in Europe. Nonetheless, some Muslim leaders want to reconquer all of Bosnia, which is unrealistic.

[Rathfelder] So you are hesitating to support the Bosnians?

[Granic] Croatia and the Bosnian Croats have interfered in the fighting around the enclave of Bihac and have thus helped the government's Army. Initially, the military struggle against the aggressors was necessary and in order, but now the situation has changed. We must reach some arrangement.

[Rathfelder] Could such an arrangement mean the inclusion of the Bosnian Serbs in the Bosnian Federation?

[Granic] First of all, I do not believe that the Serbs want to be included in such a federation.

[Rathfelder] But different sides have suggested such an option, a federation of all three constituent nations in Bosnia. Then there would be a confederation between the Croat-Bosnian Federation and Croatia on the one hand, and a confederation of the Bosnian Serbs with Serbia on the other, meaning a third Yugoslavia.

[Granic] Croatia is not ready to enter into any type of association with Serbia. However, we want normalization with Serbia.

[Rathfelder] By demanding the withdrawal of the UN troops from Croatia, do you intend to bring NATO into play?

[Granic] As for Croatia, we will help the United Nations with its withdrawal. In Bosnia the situation is different,

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and the deployment of NATO troops could become necessary if the United Nations decides to pull out. We would be ready to give the NATO troops logistical support.

Krajina Oil Pipeline To Be Opened 'This Week'

AU2501092795 Novi Sad DNEVNIK in Serbo-Croatian 24 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by R. Gladic: "Opening of Oil Pipeline a Matter of Days"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The stretch of the former Yugoslav oil pipeline from Omisija on Krk to Sisak, 75 km of which passes through Banija, that is, the territory of the republic of Serbian Krajina, has been cleared of mined, the damage repaired, and only a few more repairs need to be carried out. All eight block stations have been made operational and the terrain has also been checked by international experts. Therefore, everything is ready for its opening, which will be within days. The first tests have already been run. The oil pipeline could open today, but it will definitely be opened sometime this week. DNEVNIK was told this at the beginning of an exclusive interview with Milivoj Dricka, energy minister in the government of the republic of Serbian Krajina. [passage omitted]

"At the moment not all the details have been worked out concerning the formation of a joint Croatian-Krajina trade oil corporation, which will deal with the distribution and sale of oil in the republic of Serbian Krajina," Dricka said. "After long arguments, an agreement has been reached on continuous monthly, that is, annual quotas for the republic of Serbian Krajina. I can tell you that these amounts will be almost enough to satisfy the needs of local consumers and the price of oil will be considerably lower than at present. We have reached an agreement with the Croatian representatives, under the auspices of the International Conference [on former Yugoslavia], that the opening of the oil pipeline should not be made dependent on the prior formation of the joint company. The Croatian side had been insisting on this condition, but finally gave up, which suits us. The negotiations are to continue. If, however, an agreement on the formation of a joint company is not reached or is delayed, then there is a chance that Krajina will be compensated for the exploitation of the oil pipeline." [passage omitted]

UN Reports Increased Cease-Fire Violations

AU2401152595 Paris AFP in English 1501 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Jan 24 (AFP)—Cease-fire violations in Croatia have increased over the past few days, a spokesman for the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) said here Tuesday.

The incidents, between Croatian and Serb separatist forces, appear to have increased in the wake of the announcement by the Croatian Government that it wants UN peacekeepers to leave the country.

The Croatian Parliament, which has also accused the UN of protecting the Serb secessionists who have seized a third of the country, is to vote on the issue Wednesday.

The violations are in breach of a cease-fire accord reached between the warring parties on March 29 last year, in the wake of difficult negotiations involving Russia and the United States. On Monday, UNPROFOR reported 155 cease-fire violations, according to Michael Williams, spokesman for UN special envoy to former Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi. This was the largest number of violations to date, said Paul Risley, another spokesman.

Most violations took place along demilitarized zones separating Croatian and Serb forces. Both sides accuse each other of seeking to infiltrate forces. The more serious violations were caused by the Serbs, Williams said.

Meanwhile, UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali was holding a special meeting Tuesday in Geneva to discuss the repercussions of the Croatian Government's decision not to renew the UN mandate beyond March 31. Also attending the meeting, which will also focus on the situation in Bosnia, are Akashi and the UN military commanders.

Tudjman Receives New Envoys to Macedonia, Ukraine

LD2401194695 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, today received Dr. Onesin Cvitan and Djuro Vidmarovic and presented them with letters of accreditation as ambassadors of the Republic of Croatia in Macedonia and Ukraine, respectively.

On this occasion the Croatian president stressed that in view of their political experience, he expected the two ambassadors to carry out their duties successfully for the benefit of Croatia. The ceremony was also attended by Hrvoje Sarinic, head of the president's office; Dr. Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs; and Dr. Branimir Jaksic, an adviser to the president.

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OSCE Commissioner, Aliti View University

AU2401092895 Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 17 Jan 95 p 3

[Unattributed report: "The Albanian University Should Not Be A Handicap"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tetove, 16 January—In Skopje today, Abdurrahman Aliti, chairman of the Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP], and secretary Naser Zyberi met with Max van der Stoel, OSCE high commissioner for minorities, and Tore Bor, ambassador of this mission in Skopje.

In a lengthy conversation, Mr. van der Stoel exhibited interest in the latest political situation in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], the warning that the PDP will change its course, and a solution to Albanians' university education problems in Macedonia, especially at Tetove University.

Mr. Aliti said that, after overcoming many dilemmas, the PDP decided to participate in the administration for the sole purpose of advancing its own version of institutional solutions to problems and stability in the Republic and the region: I am afraid that our good will is not properly understood, that is why many problems that have accumulated for years meet with virtually no understanding or resolution. This leads us to believe that this course of action, which is not yielding the expected results, should be altered.

Regarding Tetove University, Chairman Aliti said that he fails to understand the fear and behavior of the Macedonian side toward Albanian demands and education requirements. We do not see this as a handicap, but as progress not only for Albanians but for the state itself. Unfortunately, this problem is not argued by experts but by force between police and university professors. If things continue in this way, no doubt Macedonia will be engulfed in a profound international crisis. For that reason, Chairman Aliti said, all political entities in Macedonia and international institutions should contribute to the proper resolution of this issue, for normal university operation.

Mr. van der Stoel said: We view the Tetove events with distress, and they may strain international relations. In our efforts to overcome these problems, Mr. van der Stoel said, we suggested to the Macedonian authorities that they urgently issue a law on local self-administration and language usage. Politicians, not the police, should discuss education problems. The need to resolve the issue of a university education is essential, and we should find a method and a way. Macedonia should come up with a law for the university and international institutions should propose a concrete project to the Macedonian Government on this issue. That is what the meeting stressed among other issues, states the communique of the PDP information service.

Increasing Number in Need of Social Benefits

AU2501115195 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 23 Jan 95 pp 1-4

[Article by M. Zlatanovic: "Social Benefits for 60,000 Families"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Because of the increasing number of people who are socially endangered, over 2.8 million dinars has been allocated from this year's budget to protect this category of people. This money will provide material assistance for around 60,000 families. This is 15,000 more than last year.

Since 1992 the minimum material and social security for citizens in need of social protection has been provided at a special protection level, as minimum social security per family and through the right to monetary benefits at this level. Last year this level was 25 percent of the average monthly wage in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] for families in which there are employed persons and pensioners. The level for the unemployed and classic social cases was 15 percent of the average wage. The Macedonian Government has not yet accepted the draft social protection program for this year. There are two variants that the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy will probably put on the agenda in the coming days. According to the first variant projected in the budget, the level of social protection would be standardized for all categories and would be 20 percent of the average monthly wage.

The second variant has been proposed by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy. According to this proposal, on which the government has not yet decided although 20 days of the first month of this year have passed, the level of social protection will depend on how many family members there are. Following the indications of the international institutions and world experiences, a single person would get 30 percent of the average wage. Two-member families would get 45 percent, three-member families 55 percent, four-member families 65 percent, while five-member families, as well as those that have more than five members, would get 70 percent of the average wage.

In addition, there is another possibility. If there are regular secondary school and university students in the family, the social protection level will be raised by 5 percent for each child. This right will be applied to families that have a monthly income that is below the social protection level, calculating the total income of all family members. Total family income consists of all the family members' wages in the last three months.

The draft social protection program also provides for the state to make a single payment to persons in need of temporary assistance. In this connection textbooks will be provided free of charge in cooperation with the Red Cross and the governmental and nongovernmental international humanitarian organizations, and families that

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have their currency savings blocked in the banks will also be paid dinars. The final decision on the protection of persons that need social protection will be made by the Macedonian Government, which has to decide shortly about the criteria, measures, ways, and procedure for implementation of social protection payments. This decision will determine the procedures and criteria for the implementation of this essential social right as the economic situation in the country continues to deteriorate and the standard of living continues to fall.

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Federal

Economic Recovery Program Yields Results

LD2401192695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1719 GMT 24 Jan 95

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 24 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav economic recovery program, introduced in 1994, has yielded results, said Ranko Hinic, a senior official in the Serbian Development Institute.

The Yugoslav Federation finished the 1994 fiscal year without inflation and with the stable currency, industrial production 63 percent up, trebled salaries, higher employment in the private sector, and with a 6.5 percent increase in the gross national product.

These are the results of the program of economic recovery and monetary reconstruction devised by Governor of the Yugoslav National Bank Dragoslav Avramovic. The monthly inflation rate exceeded 300 million percent [figure as received] before the program was launched on Jan. 24, 1994.

The results of the Yugoslav economic recovery program have been favorable in comparison with those yielded by economic programs in the countries affected by high inflation.

Compared to Poland, Israel, Brazil and the German economic program from 1923 [as received], Yugoslavia is the only country which has not been given any foreign financial support. To make the matters worse, the Yugoslav Federation has been under the total international economic blockade since May, 1992, when the United Nations imposed sanctions.

Serbia

Milosevic: UN Pullout Threatens Vance Plan

LD2401224495 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2119 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 24 Jan (TANJUG)—Republic of Serbia President Slobodan Milosevic has received Lord David Owen, cochairman of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, who arrived in Belgrade this afternoon in the company of Ambassador Kai Eide.

As the office of the president of Republic stated, views were exchanged on the most significant issues regarding progress in the peace process and the efforts to solve the Yugoslav crisis by political means.

Expressing his belief that through the mediation of the Contact Group the warring sides in former Bosnia-Herzegovina will come closer in their views on creating conditions for continuing the peace process, President Slobodan Milosevic stressed that every action leading to peace in these lands should be met with support from the international community.

As regards the situation in relations between Knin and Zagreb, President Milosevic stressed that the process of normalization, which was given a significant impetus by the signing and initial implementation of the economic agreement, is a step toward consolidating peace and stability in these lands. At the same time, he warned specifically about the great threat posed by the latest view of the Croatian authorities, according to which the presence of the UN peace force should come to an end by 31 March this year. This will threaten not only the results achieved so far in the peace process in this area, but will heighten the possibility of a conflagration of unforeseen consequences.

In Milosevic's view, the Vance plan, which provided the basis for setting up UN protected zones and the deployment of peace forces, is the best international peace document passed in connection with the Yugoslav crisis. It has been generally accepted in practice as a solid basis for resolving conflicts by negotiation. This is why it will be extremely dangerous if the Vance plan, which provided conditions for normalization of life and relations between Knin and Zagreb, were to be abandoned prior to a political solution. In so doing these international and local factors will eliminate the Vance plan as a factor in preventing the escalation of war, and will create a step in the direction of war at a time when positive developments in the normalization of relations is likely to lead to peace.

In the talks views were also exchanged on the activities of the conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

Main Road Blocked in Protest of Power Cuts

LD2401204695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2006 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Stara Pazova, 24 Jan (TANJUG)—A group of about 300 people from Novi Banovci and Stari Banovci and the Banovci-Dunav residential development blocked the main Belgrade-Novi Sad road near Novi Banovci this afternoon to protest, as they put it, against cuts in electricity and gas supplies and problems with transport to Belgrade and back.

The traffic is blocked in both directions with a column of heavy trucks at a standstill. The local Banovci-Batajnica road is also blocked.

Milosevic in Talks With Economic Officials

LD2401211395 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1611 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 24 Jan (TANJUG)—Today, on the first anniversary of the implementation of the country's economic program, Republic of Serbia

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President Slobodan Milosevic received Professor Dragoslav Avramovic; Serbian Government Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic; Federal Government Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic, who was the prime minister of the Serbian Government at the time of (?inaugurating) the program; and Nikola Stanic, coordinator of the drafting of the program within a team of experts. This was reported by the office of the president of the Republic of Serbia.

It was stated with satisfaction that the results achieved in the implementation of the economic program in 1994 testified to the realization of the planned targets and initial expectations, something that is primarily reflected in the collapse of hyperinflation, the stability of the market and prices, the introduction of a new and stable currency, the securing of a stable exchange rate and an overall increase in economic activities, particularly in industrial production, increased salaries and pensions, and a reduced number of workers on forced leave.

Special priority is attached to the consolidation of public finances and the stabilization of the state budget, i.e. to finances based on real sources, something that has, despite the current difficulties, created conditions for continuing a buoyant economic revival. Companies and banks are also expected, just like the state, to stabilize their budgets during this year.

In the course of the talks the most significant current issues were discussed [word indistinct] regarding the successful implementation of the economic program. President Slobodan Milosevic pointed out the need for supporting primary agricultural production, agriculture, and animal husbandry, stressing in particular the significance of meeting financial obligations to farmers.

Working groups in charge of salaries, pensions and taxation, financial institutions, and investments are expected to present their suggestions which will be included in a comprehensive program for the country's economic recovery.

The meeting was also attended by academician Kosta Mihailovic, adviser to the president of the Republic for economic issues.

PM Kontic Summarizes Economic Achievements

AU2401210395 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 24 Jan 95

[Report by Vjera Vukovic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Yugoslav Archive, which was established on 28 January 1950, is celebrating its 45th anniversary today. This keeper and collector of precious historic papers possesses several millions of documents in its vaults that serve to record the truth. Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic spoke about this unique treasury of the human spirit's history; however, he also pointed out that Dragoslav Avramovic's program of economic recovery and monetary rehabilitation began exactly one year ago.

[Begin Kontic recording] Positive trends in the realm of production, the standard of living, and all the aspects of demand are evident. The results are valuable because they have been achieved under conditions of numerous internal and external limitations, which were either inherited or imposed by the international blockade, and without any foreign aid, causing us to rely solely on domestic powers and resources.

Keeping all this in mind, as well as the other conditions in which production and society functioned over the past year, one must say that the achievements in numerous economic sectors exceeded everyone's expectations.

On the basis of the results accomplished and the firm resolve to further implement the stabilization program, we are entering 1995 with the utmost determination to maintain price and currency stability and the economic dynamics that must not endanger the coordinates of stability, and also strive to improve the standard of living and structural changes, including property transformation and the creation of the market economy. [end recording]

Jovan Popovic, director of this institution, also spoke about the emergence, work, and significance of the Yugoslav Archive. This anniversary was also an opportunity to organize an exhibition of original documents entitled the Yugoslav Archive—Treasury for Yugoslav History, which was opened by academician Vasilije Krestic. [passage omitted]

Draskovic Dismisses Call for United Opposition

AU2401213295 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 24 Jan 95

[Report by Ikonija Vostinic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vuk Draskovic, president of the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO], paid the greatest attention at the news conference held upon his return from Moscow not to this trip, but to everything that is currently occupying the minds of the representatives of several opposition parties, namely, the divisions within the opposition block in numerous Serbian municipalities.

Draskovic characterized a Democratic Party appeal for the so-called technical coalition of the opposition in municipal elections as the intentions of those who do not care about unification but, according to Draskovic, champion something that is hollow for deceitful reasons.

The SPO president added that his party has championed a unified front in the elections since 1993, however, the yellows—a synonym for the Democratic Party—did not

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agree to this for reasons of political marketing, which, Draskovic concluded, is most frequently a form of political deceit.

The Democratic Party yellow theater of tricks, Draskovic continued in a resigned manner, using unusual terminology for political appearances, is partying in Pale, as he said, while smuggling arms to the Muslims for financial reasons.

The Anti-Monarchist Party, Draskovic pointed, is defending monarchy from the SPO and dishonestly launching a campaign against the SPO and the Socialist Party of Serbia, condemning the SPO for its different approach and alleged cooperation with the Socialists.

Speaking about the behavior of the Democratic Party in the Serbian Assembly, Draskovic emphasized that the motto of Djindjic's deputies is: We will deceive a little, talk a little, while the results do not interest us. For this reason, it is uncalled for that they are now championing agreements within the opposition, it was stated the end of the news conference.

Montenegro

SDP on Tudjman's UNPROFOR Decision

AU2401160795 Podgorica POBJEDA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jan 95 p 4

[Article by Z. Boskovic: "Tudjman's Decision Is Dangerous"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Podgorica, 18 Jan—The conclusions the Council of the Trade Unions of Montenegro reached at its latest session and the decision made by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman to cancel the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mandate were the topics touched upon at today's news conference of the Social Democratic Party [SDP] of Montenegro. [passage omitted]

Commenting on Croatia's decision to cancel hospitality to the UNPROFOR forces, Ivan Brajovic, secretary of the SDP Executive Committee, pointed out that such a move is extremely dangerous and that it can aggravate the security situation in the entire region further. We consider this decision to be very irresponsible and think that the international community must not give in under that pressure, Brajovic concluded.

Kosovo

Bukoshi Denies Rumors of Conflict With Rugova

AU2501084195 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 21 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by "rr.": "Kosova Has No Other Way Apart From That of Independence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a long and candid interview, after a long absence from the Albanian-language media, Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, chairman of the government of the Republic of Kosovo, spoke to the weekly ZERI mostly about the position of his government in relation to its role in promoting the Albanian cause and about the will of the people for the independence of Kosova. After expressing the view that the West still does not support the independence of Kosova, Bukoshi nevertheless concludes that this world has pledged that it will not allow us to be slaughtered because of our demands. Bujar Bukoshi says that Kosova is in no way considered an internal affair of Serbia. Thus we have reached a point where we must study our tactics for realizing our goal of an independent state. Promoting our internal cause depends first of all on our people's strength and their will to achieve the independence of Kosova.

After remarking that the ears of the West are now accustomed to our wailing about Serbian violence against the Albanians, Bukoshi issues a call for people to think hard about how to liberate Kosova. Passivity, expectancy, and lethargy are not always pardonable even in private life, he says, going on to observe that the promotion of the cause of Kosova stalled last year because, as he puts it, the international community is more preoccupied with Bosnia and Chechnya. He stresses that neither the government nor anyone else has any reason to congratulate itself on its list of achievements, because these are belied by the serious and tragic situation in Kosova itself.

Replying to a question concerning criticisms aimed at the government, Bukoshi said that [words indistinct to due poor fax reception] against the institutions of the president and the government themselves. There is no Rugova-Bukoshi conflict, the prime minister said, because such a conflict is impossible. The Democratic League of Kosova is the main political force in Kosova and as such does not need to invent its opponents. It would be entirely normal for the president of the republic, to whom I am subordinate on the basis of the constitution, [words indistinct due to poor fax reception] in conflict to lead the government. Bukoshi puts forward the view that certain individuals want to persuade people that they are "defending" Rugova from Bukoshi, while tomorrow their purpose will be to strip of his office the very same person they claim to be protecting. If the government is an obstacle to this plan at the moment, the institution of president of the Republic will soon be another!

There has been a lot of speculation about my resignation, Dr. Bujar Bukoshi says. I will tender my resignation when I am persuaded that I am no longer in a positon to carry out the work that has been entrusted to me. I will tender my resignation when I see that my work has become impossible. Finally, I would tender my resignation if I reached the conclusion that another alternative that is opposed to the will of the people for the independence of Kosova prevailed in Kosova. I would also, of

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course, tender my resignation in the case of unification with Albania. Bukoshi also talks about the need to start an intra-Albanian dialogue of all political and intellectual forces, because, as he puts it, "our cause," which is often chewed to death, is not a kind of hobby but a Hamlet-like question of our existence.

Vojvodina

New Members of Vojvodina Government Elected

LD2401211195 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1345 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Novi Sad, 24 Jan (TANJUG)—At its session today, the Assembly of Vojvodina elected Dr. Radmila-Marinkovic-Neducin as the new vice president of the Executive Council of Vojvodina [deputy prime minister]. Dr. Marinkovic-Neducin is a lecturer at the Faculty of Technology in Novi Sad.

In an open vote the deputies also elected another three new members of the provincial government. Out of the three, the following two will be without portfolio: Ignacije Tonkovic of Subotica, who will be in charge of ecology, and Vladimir Stojanovic, an economist and owner of the Novi Sad-based Pansped, who will deal with the issues of entrepreneurship.

The third new member of the government is writer and economist Miodrag Karadzic. He was appointed secretary for culture and education and will replace Dr. Rodoljub Etinski, who left to take up a new post.

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